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V I. CO N CLU SION ..................................................................................................... 4 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout its history, Massachusetts has struggled to develop a
satisfactory legal mechanism to remove a tenant from possession.'
Summary process, the contemporary eviction procedure, continues to
reflect the difficulty of reconciling the significant, competing interests at
stake in housing cases. For the landlord, "real estate constitutes unique
property and... time lost in regaining it from a party in illegal possession
can represent an irreplaceable loss ....
At the same time, a tenant has a
"unique and fundamental need . . . for dwellings that are habitable and

secure." 3 The summary process statute, supplemented by legal precedent
and court procedural rules, attempts to strike a balance between these
important interests in the eviction process.
In a sense, counterclaims are a classic example of how statute,
precedent, and procedural rules work together to regulate summary process
proceedings.
Tenant counterclaims took on significance through a
combination of statutory and decisional law, and have since been
formalized in court procedural rules. Counterclaims are also an example,
however, of how these diverse strains of legal influence can lead to a
procedural regime that is at times arbitrary and even perverse. When the
relevant legal standards are unclear or conflicting, courts are forced to
fabricate procedural rules on an ad hoc basis, without the time or resources
to fully assess the policy implications of their decisions. The result is a
procedure that is at best unpredictable and at worst in conflict with the
important interests that summary process is meant to protect.
This article brings attention to the problematic treatment of
counterclaims in summary process law. It focuses on whether tenant
counterclaims are compulsory-that is, whether they are barred by claim
preclusion if not raised in summary process. A survey of relevant legal
sources indicates that the answer is far from clear. Despite a broadly held
assumption that tenant counterclaims are permissive, some courts have

1 See Act Directing the Proceedings Against Forcible Entry and Detainer, ch. 8, 1784 Mass.
Acts 19-24 (creating the first statutory dispossessory proceeding in 1784); see also 33A E.
GEORGE DAHER & HARVEY CHOPP, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW, § 16:1 (Mass. Prac. Series,
3d ed. 2009) (providing historical account of development of Massachusetts summary process
statute).
2 MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. I cmt.
3 Id-
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taken the position that they are compulsory and therefore subject to claim

preclusion. This confusion in the summary process law is likely to have a
significant prejudicial effect on tenants, who cannot easily assess or protect
against the threat they face from claim preclusion. Therefore, this paper
recommends that tenant attorneys take two forms of remedial action. First,
attorneys should adjust their practices in summary process cases to reflect

the cautious assumption that tenant counterclaims are compulsory. Second,
attorneys should develop and articulate the argument that treating tenant

counterclaims as compulsory is inconsistent with the policy interests
underlying summary process proceedings.
Part Two of this article reviews the ambiguous statutory language
and procedural rules that have given rise to confusion concerning the

proper treatment of tenant counterclaims. Parts Three and Four contrast
recent Massachusetts court decisions, holding that tenant counterclaims are
compulsory, with the broadly held assumption of summary process judges
and lawyers that such counterclaims are permissive. Finally, Part Five

identifies proper remedial procedures for tenant representatives to adopt.
Although a comprehensive solution to this problematic area of law may
need to come from the Massachusetts Legislature or Supreme Judicial

Court, this article seeks to offer short term strategies for reducing the claim
preclusion threat faced by tenants in summary process proceedings.
II. BACKGROUND LEGAL PRINCIPLES: CLAIM PRECLUSION AND
SUMMARY PROCESS COUNTERCLAIMS
The legal issues at stake in this debate do not lend themselves to
simple or categorical description. Both the common law doctrine of claim
preclusion and the Massachusetts statutory summary process procedure4
have evolved over centuries, almost entirely independently of each other.
They reflect attitudes toward civil litigation that cannot always be fully

reconciled.5 This section will not attempt to present a definitive summary
4 See DAHER & CHOPP, supra note 1, at §16:1 (recounting public policy concerns behind
revising self-help evictions and summary process procedure).
5 Claim preclusion is "based on the idea that the party to be precluded has had the incentive
and opportunity to litigate the matter fully in the first lawsuit." Heacock v. Heacock, 520 N.E.2d
151, 153, (Mass. 1988). Summary process, by contrast, is meant to secure the "just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every summary process action." MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R.
1. This emphasis on speed may not always be consistent with full litigation of all issues. See,
e.g., Boston Hous. Auth. v. O'Hannisian, No. 06-SP-031789, slip op. at 2-3 (Hous. Ct. Dep't
Order Apr. 6, 2007) (finding tenant's retaliation, discrimination and personal injury claims would
"distract the jury from the central issues to be decided"); CMJ v. Stallworth, No. 98-04095, slip
op. at I (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order Sept. 8, 1998) (granting plaintiff's motion to strike counterclaim
because it would distract from the central issue). But see Lakewood Village, LLC v. Connors,

4

SUFFOLKJOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XV

of the law, nor indeed is such a project feasible in light of the key questions
that courts have yet to answer. Rather, it highlights an important legal
conflict and introduces a framework for thinking about how this conflict
might be resolved.
A. Basic PreclusionPrinciples
The concept that a final judgment may have a preclusive effect on
later actions, commonly referred to as resjudicata,can be divided into two
distinct doctrines: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.6 Claim preclusion
prevents a party from bringing related claims in multiple lawsuits by
providing that a "valid, final judgment" is "conclusive on the parties ...
and bars further litigation of all matters that were or should have been
adjudicated in the action.",7
Issue preclusion prevents a party from
litigating the same issue in multiple lawsuits. 8 By foreclosing duplicative
litigation of claims and issues, these two doctrines jointly "relieve parties
of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources,
and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on
adjudication." 9 Claim and issue preclusion are "based on the idea that the
party to be precluded has had the incentive and opportunity to litigate the
matter fully in the first lawsuit."' 1
In general, issue preclusion applies with full force to summary
process proceedings. Thus, for example, in Possehl v. Ossino,"1 issue
preclusion applied to bar a tenant from bringing a negligence claim against
his landlord.' 2 The tenant had raised the identical claim in an earlier
summary process proceeding, which had ended in an agreement for

No. 06-SP-031789, slip op. at I (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order March 23, 2005) (allowing tenant claims
despite recognizing "landlord's right to expeditious determination of the summary process case").
6 See Bagley v. Moxley, 555 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Mass. 1990) ("The phrase 'res judicata'
encompasses both the doctrine of 'claim preclusion' and the doctrine of 'issue preclusion."'
(citing Heacock, 520 N.E.2d at 152 n.2).
7 Heacock, 520 N.E.2d at 152-53.
See Cousineau v. Laramee, 448 N.E.2d 756, 759 n.4 (Mass. 1983) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982)) ("[W]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties whether on the same or a
different claim.").
9 Bagley, 555 N.E.2d at 231 (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)).
10 Heacock, 520 N.E.2d at 153 (quoting Foster v. Evans, 429 N.E.2d 995, 1000 n.10 (Mass.
1981)).
11 547 N.E.2d 59 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
12 Id. at 60 (barring negligence claim "the tenant cranked up" after eviction settlement).
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judgment in favor of the landlord.' 3 The court affirmed dismissal of the
tenant's suit, noting that "parties may not relitigate a claim which has been
submitted to the court for decision and which has become the subject of a
final and unappealed judgment in that forum."' 14 Similarly, issue preclusion
allegations actually
has also applied to bar a landlord from reasserting
5
litigated in a prior summary process proceeding.'
The applicability of claim preclusion to summary process
The Massachusetts statute
proceedings is a more difficult question.
governing summary process does not directly address the applicability of
claim preclusion in most circumstances. 6 In Bui v. Ma,17 however, the
court squarely applied claim preclusion to the claims of a landlord in
summary process." s Bui involved a second summary process action
brought against the same tenant by a successor landlord.' 9 Applying basic
claim preclusion principles, the court concluded that the successor landlord
was barred from raising certain claims to possession that could have been
raised by her predecessor in interest in the first summary process action.2"
As the court explained: "[T]he guiding principle is that [the current
landlord] is precluded from litigating not only those claims that were
action] but also those that
actually decided in the [prior surmnary' 2 process
1
could have been brought in that action. ,
13 Id. (stating history of case).
14 Id.
15 See Misujo Realty Trust v. 5215 Dev. Inc., 2002 Mass. App. Div. 136, 137 (App. Div.
2002) (citing Wright Mach. Corp. v. Seaman-Andwall Corp., 307 N.E.2d 826, 829-30 (Mass.
1974)) ("Misujo failed to [appeal the previous judgment], and must thus be deemed to have
waived any objection to that decision and any right to bring a subsequent action raising the same
issue.").
16 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, §§ 1-13 (2008). Section 7 is the only portion of the
statute that directly addresses the issue of claim preclusion. It states that judgment in a summary
process proceeding "shall not be a bar to any action thereafter brought by either party to recover
the land or tenements in question, or to recover damages for any trespass thereon." Id. at § 7.
Though this provision could be read to apply to all claims, it has been narrowly interpreted to
mean only that subsequent actions to settle title in the land are not barred by claim preclusion.
See Edwards v. Columbia Amusement Co., 102 N.E. 268, 269 (Mass. 1913) (finding previous
version of MASS. GrN. LAWS ch. 239 § 7 only prevented preclusion if tenant sought "to settle the
title").
1 818 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
1 See id. at 578. In its discretion, a court may nevertheless permit a landlord to split his
summary process claim for possession from o,her tenancy-related claims. See Qureshi v. In Fiske
Capital Mgmt. Co., 796 N.E.2d 459, 463 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (holding landlord could bring
its summary process action in separate forum from previous, tenant initiated suit), qfl"d 2002
Mass. App. Div. 117 (App. Div. 2002). Under such circumstances, the summary process
proceeding would not have a claim preclusive effect on the related litigation. Id.
19 Bui, 818 N.E.2d at 576 (recounting subsequent eviction actions based on rent dispute).
20 Id. at 578-80 (holding claim preclusion barred landlord's claims).
21 Id. at 579.
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Thus, the outstanding question, explored throughout this article, is
whether claim preclusion applies to the counterclaims of a tenant in
summary process. In general, claim preclusion principles do not apply to
defendants' counterclaims unless a statute or rule of court makes those
counterclaims "compulsory. 2 2 The Massachusetts procedural rules contain
two relevant provisions: one from the rules broadly governing civil actions
and one from the rules more narrowly governing summary process
proceedings.23 Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 13 ("Rule 13"), with
certain exceptions not relevant to our analysis, makes counterclaims
compulsory if they "arise[] out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim. '24 By contrast, Uniform
Summary Process Rule 5 ("Rule 5") specifically provides that summary
process counterclaims "shall not be considered compulsory. 2 5 The proper
reconciliation of these two provisions cannot be determined in an
informational vacuum. Rather, one must first look to the history and
context of Rule 5 in order to understand its intended scope and the manner
in which courts will likely interpret it.
B. Uniform Summary Process Rule 5
1. Status of Summary Process Counterclaims Prior to Adoption of
Summary Process Rule 5
As reviewed in the previous section, claim preclusion only applies
to counterclaims that are treated as compulsory under the applicable
procedural rules.26
Unfortunately, Massachusetts policymakers have
historically given little official attention to the proper treatment of
summary process counterclaims.
No statute addresses this issue.
Furthermore, prior to 1980, there were no uniform court procedural rules

22 See Mitchell v. Stein, 2002 Mass. App. Div. 40, 42 (App. Div. 2002) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22 cmt. e (1982)) (explaining counterclaim
preclusion doctrine outlined in MASS. R. Civ. P. 13(a)). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments
suggests the rationale for this exception is that a "defendant should not be required to assert his
claim in the forum or the proceeding chosen by the plaintiff, but should be allowed to bring suit at
a time and place of his own selection. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22 cmt. a
(1982).
23 See MASS. R. Civ. P. 13; MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5.
24 MASS. R. CiV. P. 13(a).
2i MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5 (emphasis added).

26 See supra notes 22 and accompanying text (discussing limited application of claim
preclusion).
27 See supra note 16 (providing minimal statutory basis for counterclaim preclusion).
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Rule 13, which makes
governing summary process proceedings.
counterclaims compulsory if they arise out of the same "transaction or
29
occurrence," did not necessarily apply to summary process proceedings.
Rather, summary process was governed by the cryptic requirement that it
"follow the course of the common law, as near to [the Rules of Civil
Procedure] as may be ....
Available pre-1980 case law also provides little insight respecting
the historical treatment of summary process counterclaims. Although
several decisions held that summary process proceedings had "res

judicata" effect against the tenant, these cases appear to have involved relitigation of issues previously litigated in summary process and did not
address the extent to which counterclaims would be treated as
compulsory. 3' Local procedural rules for summary process proceedings,
which existed in both Hampden County and the City of Boston prior to the
state-wide adoption of uniform rules, are also inconclusive." In both
jurisdictions, the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure were applicable
unless the local summary process rules specified otherwise. 33 Therefore,
absent clear contradiction, Rule 13's compulsory counterclaim standard
would apply. 34 In Boston, the summary process rules did appear to reject
Rule 13, providing "[c]ounterclaims shall not be compulsory., 35 In
28 See inJra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (describing creation of uniform summary
process rules).
29 MASS R. CiV. P. 81(a) (limiting applicability of Mass. R. Civ. P. in various proceedings,
including sunmary process).
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., Goode v. Esterman, 342 Mass. 527, 528 (1961) (noting "resjudicata" established
end to tenancy); Gordon v. Sales, 147 N.E.2d 803, 804 (Mass. 1958) (declining to consider
adequacy of notice based on res judicata effect of prior summary process proceeding) Edwards v.
Columbia Amusement Co., 102 N.E. 268, 269 (Mass. 1913) (holding lack of notice in prior
dispossessory proceeding "became res judicata between these parties").
32 Compare BOSTON HOUS. CT. R. IN SUMM. PROCESS ACTIONS 3 (1979) (repealed 1980)
(rejecting claim preclusion), with HAMPDEN COUNTY R. GOVERNING SUMM. PROCEISS ACTIONS
6 (1979) (repealed 1980) (implicitly allowing claim preclusion by failing to contradict Rule 13).
The Uniform Summary Process Rules, which replaced the local rules in 1980, established
uniform rules for summary process proceedings throughout the state. See infira notes 57-58 and
accompanying text.
33 See BOSTON HouS. CT. R. IN SUMM. PROCESS ACTIONS 1 (1979) (repealed 1980) ("Where
a procedure is not specifically prescribed by these rules, the procedure to be followed, unless
inconsistent with or proscribed by these rules, shall be the applicable procedure set out in the
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure"); HAMPDEN COUNTY R. GOVERNING SUMM. PROCESS
ACTIONS 1 (1979) (repealed 1980) ("Where a procedure is not specifically prescribed by these
Rules, the procedure to be followed, unless specified otherwise by these Rules, shall be as near as
possible to the applicable procedure set out in the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure").
3 See supra note 33; see also MASS. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (noting claims that arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence are compulsory counterclaims).
35 BOSTON HouS. CT. R. IN SUMM. PROCESS ACTIONS 3(c) (1979) (repealed 1980).
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Hampden County, however, the summary process rules did not contradict
Rule 13, merely allowing for assertion of any counterclaim
that is "within
36
the jurisdiction of the Court in Summary Process Cases.,
One contemporaneous source suggests that counterclaims were not
treated as compulsory before 1980.37 In a 1980 letter to Massachusetts
Lawyer's Weekly, David Kerman, a tenant attorney at the time and now a
housing court judge, stated it would be "consistent with both prevailing
practice and with statutory and common law requirements" to treat tenants'
counterclaims in summary process as permissive, rather than compulsory.3"
This assertion indicates that prior to 1980, summary process counterclaims
were permissive and, therefore, not subject to claim preclusion.39
However, there are at least two reasons to be wary of drawing grand
inferences from these comments.
First, as noted, Judge Kerman
represented tenants at the time he made these comments, and therefore may
have been taking an aggressive position on the law that was more favorable
to his clients.4 ° Second, Judge Kerman's discussion of the permissive
nature of counterclaims focused on the fact that tenants should be allowed
to bring counterclaims, rather than on the corollary fact that claim
preclusion should not apply. 4' Thus, while worthy of consideration, Judge
Kerman's argument cannot be treated as definitive.
The dearth of early precedent concerning treatment of tenant
counterclaims may be at least partially attributable to traditional common
law principles limiting tenants' legal recourse in summary process

Although this rule, along with all of the local summary process rules, was replaced by the
Uniform Summary Process Rules in 1980, its language is closely approximated in the current
MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5, which states: "Counterclaims shall not be considered
compulsory.. The current rules are discussed in detail below. See infra notes 57-70 and
accompanying text.
36 HAMPDEN COUNTY R. GOVERNING SUMM. PROCESS ACTIONS 6 (1979) (repealed 1980).
37 See David D. Kerman, Letter to the Editor, 8 MASS. LAW. WKLY., March 31, 1980, at 684
(providing "neutral approach" to proposed summary process rules). In this 1980 letter to
Massachusetts Lawyer's Weekly, David Kerman, who was a tenants' attorney at the time, argued
that, with minor modifications, the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure should govern
summary process actions. Id. David Kerman is now First Justice of the Northeast Housing
Court.
See http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/northeasthousingjl.html
(last
accessed Jan. 7, 2010).
38 See Kerman, supra note 37, at 685 ("[B]ecause the coupling of a money damage
claim ... with a claim for possession of land often frustrates settlement, no counterclaim ... is
deemed compulsory in an action for summary process.").
39 See id. at 685 (asserting summary process counterclaims were permissive in practice prior
to 1980).
40 See id. at 684 (noting that the author is "certainly a lawyer who represents tenants").
41 See id. at 685 (stressing counterclaims should be "interposable" in summary process).
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Traditionally, the doctrine of caveat emptor established that
proceedings.
tenants did not have any legal claim for damages against their landlords
based on the conditions of the premises alone. 43 Furthermore, because the
obligation to pay rent was considered independent of any covenants of the
landlord, even successful counterclaims would generally not be valid
defenses against a landlord's claim of possession for nonpayment of rent.44
Thus, although the practice was not unheard of, tenants rarely had an
incentive to raise counterclaims in summary process proceedings. 45
A combination of judicial and legislative action beginning in the
late 1960s and developing throughout the 1970s dramatically reversed this
constrained judicial approach to tenant counterclaims. 46 In 1965, the
Massachusetts legislature added a new section to the summary process
Challenging the traditional rule of independent covenants,
statute.
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 239, Section 8A permitted tenants to
withhold rent if the rented premises were "in violation of the standards of
fitness for human habitation established under the state sanitary code ...
-47
A tenant withholding rent in accordance with the relatively technical

42

See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transfbrmation ofAmerican Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C.

L. REV. 503, 509-17 (1982) (describing limited rights of tenants under traditional American
landlord-tenant law); see also Michael Madison, The Real Properties of Contract Law, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 405, 410-13 (2002) (framing traditional landlord-tenant law as a "property approach").
43 See Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201, 202 (1870) ("It is now well settled, both here
and in England, that in a lease of a building for a dwelling-house or store no covenant is implied
that it should be fit for occupation."), overruled in part by Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway,
293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973).
44 Royce, 106 Mass. at 202-03 (stating old common law rule barring tenant from refusing to
pay rent due to habitability issues). The Royce court limited the tenant's remedy to an "action for
damages." Id.
45 See Glendon, supra note 42, at 512 (portraying summary process under traditional rules as
"primarily" a tool to benefit landlords). But see Ferguson v. Jackson, 62 N.E. 965, 965 (Mass.
1902) (recognizing tenant right to assert claim to right of renewal in summary process). There is
some support for the view that, prior to explicit statutory recognition of the practice in 1975,
tenants had no legal authority to bring counterclaims in summary process. See Fafard v. Lincoln
Pharmacy of Milford, Inc., 789 N.E.2d 147, 149 (Mass. 2003). However, as one housing court
judge and scholar has noted, "in a residential context, affirmative defenses and counterclaims
outside the purview of [the statute] are often raised in summary process cases." David D.
Kerman, Bench Memorandum for Residential Sunmary Process Cases in 2 RESIDENTIAL AND
COMMERCIAL LANDLORD-TENANT PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS, App. 2, at § 37 (Catherine F.
Downing ed., 2001 & Supps. 2004, 2006); see also Pafumi v. Halgas, No. 06-SP-0844 (Hous. Ct.
Dep't Order Mar. 24, 2006) (allowing tenant to bring counterclaim in fault eviction, even though
practice not recognized by statute).
46 See generally Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties From the Law:
Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997 J. DtsP.
RESOL. 53, 65-70 (1997) (describing changes in critique of role of mediation in Massachusetts
summary process practice).
47 Act Providing That Violations Of Standards Of Fitness For Human Habitation Shall
Constitute A Defense In Actions of Summary Process To Recover Possession Of Rented Or
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requirements of the statute could use this as a full defense in any summary
process action for nonpayment of rent.4 ' Building on this legislative action,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Boston Housing Authority

v. Hemingway,49 first recognized the existence of an implied warranty of
habitability in all residential leases. 50 At the time Hemingway was decided,
section 8A's technical requirements for withholding rent still limited a

tenant's ability to raise the implied warranty as a defense in summary
process.51
Shortly thereafter, however, the legislature loosened the
requirements of section 8A by removing the tenant's obligations to give
prior written notice of rent withholding and to prove any code violations by

inspection.- These changes potentially made claims for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability a viable defense for many more tenants.53
Throughout the 1970s, both the courts and the Massachusetts
Legislature continued to expand the range of counterclaims available to
tenants as defenses in summary process.54 The Massachusetts Appeals

Leased Premises, ch. 888, 1965 Mass. Acts 731 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 239, § 8A (2004)).
48 See id. The statute required prior notification in writing to the landlord of the tenant's
intention to withhold rent. Id. It was later expanded to include evictions without fault. See Act
Further Regulating The Recovery Of Possession By Summary Process Of Rented Or Leased
Premises In Cases Of Violation Of Standards Of Fitness For Human Habitation, ch. 420, 1967
Mass. Acts 315 (codified as amended at ch. 239, § 8A).
" 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973).
o Id. at 842-43 (recognizing implied warranty of habitability in residential leases); see also
Glendon, supra note 42, at 528 (describing catalytic effect of this legislation on judicial
development of implied warranty of habitability).
51 See Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d at 844-45 (explaining limitations on using breach of warranty
of habitability as a complete defense to eviction).
2 See Act Clarifying The Rent Withholding Laws, ch. 963, 1977 Mass. Acts 1400 (codified
as amended at ch. 239, § 8A) (loosening requirements for raising implied warranty of habitability
defense to eviction). Before this time, tenants were required to provide prior written notice to
their landlords before withholding rent and had to have an inspection of the unit to prove any
code violation. See Ch. 888, 1965 Mass. Acts at 731.
See Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutorty Warranties of Habitability in
Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANNuAL 3, 42-43 (1979) (concluding
because of amendments, "tenants should more often be successful in defeating summary eviction
suits").
54 See Act Further Regulating Rent Withholding And Rent Receivership
Procedures, ch. 467,
§ 3, 1975 Mass. Acts 483 (codified as amended at ch. 239, § 8A (2004)) (tenant has right to use
"any counterclaim that said person may bring in good faith against the landlord, including any
damages owed because of breach of warranty or a violation of any other law" as a defense for
nonpayment in summary process). See generally Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 396 N.E.2d
981, 983 (Mass. 1979) (holding lack of fault no defense for landlord's breach of warranty of
habitability). The court based its decision in part on the "social changes in landlord-tenant
relations" embodied in Boston HousingAuthority v. Hemingwav, 293 N.E.2d 831, 844-45 (Mass.
1973). Id. Today, a tenant facing eviction without fault or for nonpayment of rent can raise, as a
defense in summary process, "any claim against the plaintiff relating to or arising out of such
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Court has accurately captured the effect of these parallel judicial and
legislative efforts, describing it as a "metamorphosis of summary process
actions," from specialized adjudications of the right of possession into "an
almost complete civil proceeding. 55 In the wake of this sea change to the
underlying structure and purpose of summary process, a special committee
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court took up the task of
developing uniform procedural rules to govern summary process
proceedings.56
2. Adoption of Summary Process Rule 5
In January 1980, the Supreme Judicial Court Joint Committee on
Uniform Summary Process Rules published proposed rules to govern all
summary process proceedings in Massachusetts. 7 After allowing six
months for public comment, the Committee adopted the final rules in July
of 1980, and they became effective on September 1st of the same year. 58 A
version of Summary Process Rule 5, entitled "COUNTERCLAIMS,"

existed in both the original and final rules. 59

The most significant

amendment to the rule concerned the scope of permissible counterclaims.
The original proposed rule limited counterclaims to those arising out of

"transactions and occurrences directly related to the landlord-tenant
relationship.,

60

However, the final rule allowed litigants to raise any

counterclaims permitted under section 8A of the summary process statute,
which is arguably broader. 61

Despite these differences, the crucial

language is identical in both the original and final versions of Rule 5, and

property, rental, tenancy, or occupancy for breach of warranty, for a breach of any material
provision of the rental agreement, or for a violation of any other law." Ch. 239, § 8A (2004).
55 Shea v. Neponset River Marine & Sportfishing, Inc., 437 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Mass. App. Ct.
1982) (observing legislative efforts granted "plaintiffs the right to recover rent and use and
occupation damages and defendants the right to counterclaim").
56 See inf'a note 57-58 and accompanying text.
57 See ProposedNew Summar, Process Rules. 8 MASS. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 21, 1980, at 43739. The members of the committee were: Hampden Housing Court Judge Edward C. Peck, Jr.:
Supreme Judicial Court Deputy Administrative Assistant Robert S. Bloom; Boston Municipal
Court Civil Clerk Michael J. Coleman; District Court Administrative Attorney John M. Connors:
and Superior Court Assistant Clerk (Civil) Christine M. Mackay. See Unifbrm Eviction Rules
Proposed,8 MASS. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 21, 1980, at 421.
58 New Summary Process Rules Set, 8 MASS. LAW. WKLY., July 21, 1980, at1035.
59 See ProposedNew Summaty Process Rules, supra note 57; New Sunuari, Process Ru/es
Set, supra note 58.
60 ProposedNew Summarv Process Rules, supra note 57.
61 Section 8A permits a tenant to raise "any claim against the plaintiff relating to or arising
out of such property, rental, tenancy, or occupancy.......Ch. 239, § 8A (2004).
discussion of this provision, see supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.

For further
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remains the same today: "Counterclaims shall not be considered
compulsory: that is, they shall not be considered waived for the purpose of
a separate civil action or actions if not asserted in a summary process
action., 62 Although possible exceptions are considered below, the clear
import of this provision is that summary process counterclaims are
generally permissive.
The Uniform Summary Process Rules also contain a brief
commentary in conjunction with each rule.6 3
The commentary
accompanying Rule 5 does not speak directly to the issue of claim
preclusion, rather it asserts that 1) counterclaims are permissible, but 2)
they are also severable, under most circumstances, pursuant to the court's
discretion:
This rule recognizes the statutory right of summary process
defendants to assert counterclaims ..
....
Because
counterclaims are not compulsory, the court retains
discretion to sever a counterclaim which cannot
appropriately be heard as part of the summary process
action. It would, however, appear to be contrary to the law
to sever a counterclaim which is being relied upon as a
defense under G.L. c. 239, § 8A.64
These comments can best be understood in light of the dramatic
expansion to summary process that occurred in the 1960s and 70s. 65 It
appears that, in Rule 5, the Committee attempted to accommodate these
new legal rights of tenants, while still preserving to some degree the
traditional role of summary process proceedings as efficient, streamlined
suits for possession.66
62

MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5. The full text of the Rule provides as follows:

Counterclaims shall be permitted in accordance with the provisions of G.L. c. 239, §
8A. Counterclaims shall be set forth in the defendant's answer and shall be expressly
designated as counterclaims. The right to counterclaim shall be deemed to be waived
as to the pending action if such a claim is not filed with the answer pursuant to Rule 3,
unless the court shall otherwise order on motion for cause shown. Counterclaims shall
not be considered compulsory; that is, they shall not be considered waived for the
purpose of a separate civil action or actions if not asserted in a summary process
action. No responsive pleading to a counterclaim is necessary.
Id.
63 See generall' MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. I
64 MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5 cmt.

13 cmt.

65 See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text (recounting judicial and legislative overhaul

of summary process).
6,6 See MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 1 cmt. (noting contrasting goals of protecting
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In sum, the text of Rule 5 clearly demonstrates that summary
process counterclaims are meant to be permissive, at least as a default
This treatment is also likely consistent with common law
principle
practice prior to adoption of the Uniform Summary Process Rules6.
Therefore, applying basic preclusion principles, it seems that claim
preclusion should not apply to such permissive counterclaims. 6 9 As Rule 5
itself states, counterclaims "shall not be considered waived for the purpose
of a separate civil action or actions if not asserted in a summary process
action." ,70 We now complete our review of relevant legal principles by
considering whether there is any reason to qualify Rule 5's seemingly clear
and comprehensive protection for summary process counterclaims.
C. Reconciling PreclusionPrinciples with Summary ProcessRule 5
As we have seen, there are two conflicting strands in
Massachusetts procedural practice. On the one hand, under Massachusetts
Rule of Civil Procedure 13, counterclaims are compulsory, and therefore
subject to claim preclusion, if they "arise[] out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.",71 On
the other hand, under Uniform Summary Process Rule 5, all counterclaims
in summary process "shall not be considered compulsory." 2 There is no

tenants' rights while streamlining eviction procedure). The commentary to MASS. UNIF. SUMM.
PROCESS R. I acknowledges the influence of these concerns over the rules development process:
These rules seek to reconcile two competing principles. The first is that time is of the
essence in eviction cases. This is based on the notion that real estate constitutes unique
property and that because it generates income, time lost in regaining it from a party in
illegal possession can represent an irreplaceable loss to the owner. The Legislature
clearly recognized these factors in creating a special chapter of the General Laws
establishing a "summary" procedure. The other principle involved is the unique and
fundamental need of tenants for dwellings that are habitable and secure. Recognition
of this need has resulted in extensive changes through case law in the legal relationship
between tenants and landlords and a host of legislative enactments providing tenants
with new rights and remedies. These changes have made the legality of possession an
often difficult and complex judicial question.
Id.
67 See supra notes 60-62

and accompanying text (describing textual support for the
conclusion that summary process counterclaims are permissive).
(" See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that counterclaims
were treated as pennissive in practice).
69 See Mitchell v. Stein, 2002 Mass. App. Div. 40, 42 (App. Div. 2002) (explaining that
claim preclusion only applies to compulsory counterclaims).
70 MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS
R. 5.
71 MASS. R. CIv. P. 13(a).
72 MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5.
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doubt that "a rule of court has the force of law, and is binding upon a
judge. 73 The important question yet to be resolved, however, is to what
extent, if any, judges should construe Rule 13 as limiting the effect of Rule
5.
Uniform Summary Process Rule 1 provides general guidelines for
courts and litigants in attempting to resolve conflicts between summary
process rules and more generally applicable rules of civil procedure.74
First, the Rule states that "[p]rocedures not prescribed by [the Uniform
Summary Process Rules] shall be governed by the Massachusetts Rules of
Civil Procedure insofar as the latter are not inconsistent with these rules,
with applicable statutory law or with the jurisdiction of the particular court
in which they would be applied."75 Second, as an interpretive matter, both
the summary process rules and applicable rules of civil procedure "shall be
construed and applied to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive
76
determination of every summary process action.,
Applying the above principles, one plausible interpretation is that
Rule 5 is facially inconsistent with Rule 13, and therefore Rule 5 alone
governs summary process counterclaims. On this view, all counterclaims
in summary process are permissive and should be protected from the
effects of claim preclusion. Other interpretations, however, are also
possible. Based on the explicit sanction to consider speed and economy
when interpreting the rules, as well as the absence of any legislative
guidance on the matter, one could argue Rule 5 should be more narrowly
construed. For example, one could argue that Rule 5 must be read as fully
constrained by Rule 13. Thus, counterclaims would only be permissive
under Rule 5 if they did not "arise" out of the same "transaction or
occurrence" as the landlord's claim for possession, under Rule 13.
Alternatively, one could argue that Rule 5 only applies if the tenant is
willing to forgo all counterclaims in summary process. Raising any
counterclaims, however, would trigger Rule 13 in full force, and would
make all of the tenant's counterclaims compulsory that arise out of the

73 Pratt v. Pratt, 157 Mass. 503, 505 (Mass. 1892) (citing Baker v. Blood, 128 Mass. 543, 545
(Mass. 1880)) (recognizing binding nature of court rules governing divorce proceedings).
74 MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. I (outlining scope and applicability of Uniform
Summary Process Rules).
75 Id.
76 Id. The commentary to Rule I further clarifies that "[t]he need ... is for rules that will
ensure expeditious proceedings and yet comprehend all potential substantive and procedural
complexities." MASS. UNIF.SUMM. PROCESS R. 1 cmt.
77 See MASS. R. CIv. P. 13(a) ("A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim for
relief ...if it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim ...").
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same transaction.
Given Rule 5's explicit classification of counterclaims as
permissive, the textual argument that it entirely supersedes Rule 13 in the
context of summary process proceedings is quite persuasive. However,
there does not appear to be any definitive evidence regarding the intent of
the rules committee, much less that of the Legislature, or of common law
practice. Thus, the judiciary is not clearly bound to any particular
interpretation of Rule 5. Taking full advantage of this discretion, courts
have offered a range of positions on the claim preclusive effect of summary
process actions on tenants' counterclaims.7 8
III. THE CLAIM PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF SUMMARY PROCESS
PROCEEDINGS IN RECENT CASE LAW
As the above discussion illustrates, a facial review of the Uniform
Summary Process Rules could easily lead one to conclude that Rule 5 fully
protects tenants in summary process from the effects of claim preclusion. 9
Some support for this view can also be gathered from the Massachusetts
Appeals Court's decision in Turner v. Community Homeowner's Ass 'n,
Inc.8 ° The court in Turner rejected a landlord's contention that its tenant
should be barred from bringing an affirmative suit because her claim could
have been raised in an earlier summary process action.81 Although the
court emphasized the consent of the parties, it also noted, in dicta, that it
could not "find anything in our procedural rules to support [the landlord's]
argument of claim preclusion. 8 2 The court then cited Rule 5, as well as
MASS. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(1)(7), which "exempts summary process actions
from the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure." 8 3 These comments
could plausibly be understood as a blanket rejection of claim preclusion
principles in the summary process context. 4
78 See Turner v. Cmty. Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 816 N.E. 2d 537, 544 n. 12 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2004) (suggesting claim preclusion would not apply under any circumstances to summary
process); Doyle v. Baltaks, 2007 Mass. App. Div. 43, 44-46 (App. Div. 2007) (holding claim
preclusion would apply where tenant had raised counterclaims in summary process); Murray v.
Zjllo, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 293, 293-95 (Super. Ct. 2005) (applying claim preclusion even though
tenant raised no counterclaims in summary process).
79 See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text (summarizing the content of Rule 5).
so 816 N.E. 2d 537 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
81 Id. at 544 (rejecting application of claim preclusion to counterclaims not raised in
summary process proceedings).
82 Id. at 544 n. 12.
83 Id.
84 Two earlier decisions from

Massachusetts appellate courts provide additional,
circumstantial support for this position. See Qureshi v. Fiske Capital Mgmt. Co., 796 N.E.2d
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Despite this appearance of agreement, the conclusion that claim
preclusion does not apply to summary process proceedings is far from
settled law.15 Indeed, recent decisions by Massachusetts courts strongly
indicate that the premise is invalid. 86 In at least two cases after Turner, trial
courts have applied the doctrine of claim preclusion to bar affirmative suits
brought by tenants after the conclusion of a summary process action against
them. 7 One court in the Massachusetts Appellate Division has also
provided at least qualified support for this practice.88 Finally, courts in
states with summary process procedural rules similar to those of
Massachusetts have held that claim preclusion still applies.89 These
developments call for a reassessment of the risks facing tenants in summary
process proceedings.
A. Trial Court DismissalsBased on Preclusive Effect of Summary Process
Proceedings
Two 2005 trial court decisions demonstrate the judicial willingness
to dismiss affirmative suits by tenants based on the preclusive effect of a
summary process action. In Young v. Estate of Lapolito,90 a former tenant
sought to recover damages from his landlord for breach of contract based
on a deed allegedly transferring him title to the property. 9' An earlier
summary process action between the parties had been settled by an
agreement for judgment, in which the tenant agreed to vacate the premises
and the landlord waived the rent that was due.92 Although the tenant had

459, 463 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (approving lower court's decision to adjudicate tenant's
claims in separate forum from summary process action); Univ. of Lowell Research Found. v.
Classic Elite Yarns, Inc., 1998 Mass. App. Div. 200, 202-03 (App. Div. 1998) (noting tenant
could bring counterclaims in later action because summary process counterclaims are
permissive).
85 Compare Turner, 816 N.E. 2d at 544 n. 12 (suggesting claim preclusion would not apply),
with Doyle v. Baltaks 2007 Mass. App. Div. 43, 44-46 (App. Div. 2007) (holding claim
preclusion would apply without reference to Turner).
86 See Young v. Estate of Lapolito, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 154, 154 (Super. Ct. 2005) (applying
claim preclusion in summary process); Murray v. Zullo, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 293, 293 (Super. Ct.
2005) (same).
87 See supra note 86.
88 See Doyle, 2007 Mass. App. Div. at 45.
89 See McAlpine v. Patrick, No. 86453, 2006 WL 562191, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 9.
2006) (holding claim preclusion does apply under Ohio statute and procedural rules); McHenry v.
Hubbard, 134 P.2d 1107, 1110-15 (Kan. 1943) (reasoning claim preclusion would apply under
Kansas statute at the time).
90 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 154 (Super. Ct. 2005).
91 Id. (summarizing tenants defense to rent obligations based on valid deed transfer).
92 Id. (discussing procedural history of case).
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moved to amend his answer to raise his ownership claim as an affirmative
defense, it appeared that the Superior Court had not addressed the motion
prior to settlement of the case.93
Based on this slightly odd procedural history, the court in Young
held that the tenant had not clearly included his ownership claim within the
summary process agreement for judgment, and was therefore not barred by
issue preclusion.94 The court went on to conclude, however, that the
ownership claim was nevertheless barred by claim preclusion. 95
It
reasoned that the ownership claim arose "out of the same set of facts as the
original question of who possessed the contested property," and therefore
should have been litigated in the summary process action. 96 Interestingly,
the court viewed the abortive attempt to include the ownership claim in the
summary process action as "strong evidence" in support of its conclusion
that the two cases arose out of the same set of facts. 7 The court does not
appear to have considered the relevance of Rule 5 or any other aspects of
summary process proceedings.98
The decision in Murray v. Zullo 99 constitutes an even more
expansive application of claim preclusion to a summary process action.100
The tenant in Murray had not raised any counterclaims during the summary
process action brought against her, in which she represented herself pro
se.'0 ' After judgment was entered in favor of the landlords in the summary
process action, the tenant brought an affirmative suit alleging, inter alia,
breaches of the implied warranty of habitability and covenant of quiet
enjoyment, retaliation, and illegal transfer of responsibility for payment of
utilities. 102
In dismissing all of these claims, the court expressed a
particularly broad understanding of the preclusive effect of summary
process proceedings. ° 3 As in Young, the court in Murray made no

93 Id. (noting record did not "indicate any action" by trial court on tenant's motions).
94 Id. (holding no issue preclusion).
95 Id. at 154 (reasoning efficiency required finality on ownership claims).
96 Young, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. at 154.
97 id.
98 Beyond Rule 5, it is also surprising that the Young court did not consider chapter 239,
section 7 of the Massachusetts General Laws, which expressly preserves the right of summary
process litigants to bring subsequent actions settling title in the land. See also supra note 16
(discussing section 7).
99 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 293 (Super. Ct. 2005).
100 See id. (reasoning plaintiff tenant "could and should have litigated" claims in summary
process).
101 Id.
102 Id. (recounting plaintiffs claims raised after summary process action).
103 See id at 295. The court reasoned that:
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reference to Rule 5.104
B. The Doyle Decision and Its Implications
05
In Doyle v. Baltaks,1
the Appellate Division directly considered,
and rejected, the argument that Rule 5 protects tenants from the effects of
claim preclusion.'0 6 The case involved a suit by a former tenant against his
landlord for, inter alia, breach of the warranty of habitability and violation
of the security deposit statute.' v The parties had previously participated in
a summary process action, in which the tenant had raised counterclaims
based on similar allegations concerning the condition of the premises.'0 8
The previous action had ended with an agreement for judgment in favor of
the landlord.' 0 9 The trial court, consistent with the trend noted in the
previous section, dismissed all but one of the tenant's claims on the basis of
claim preclusion. "°
On appeal, the Appellate Division court first noted that the
summary process action did have preclusive effect in the present case."'

The guiding principle here is that [the tenant] is precluded from litigating not only
those claims that were actually decided in the summary process action, but also those
that could have been brought in that action ....
By entering a judgment for the
[landlords] in the summary process action, the Natick District Court judge necessarily
determined that the [landlords] had properly terminated the tenancy and were entitled
to gain possession of the Apartment. Although [the tenant] did not assert any
counterclaims or affirmative defenses ... the summary process action was the
proceeding in which to raise these issues. Because the facts [the tenant] now
asserts... all grew out of the same transaction or occurrence (namely, the tenancy),
the district court's decision prevents her from litigating those claims later in this new
forum.

Id. at 295 (internal citation omitted).
104 See Young v. Estate of Lapolito, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 154, 154 (Super. Ct. 2005); Murray,
20 Mass. L. Rptr. at 293.
105 2007 Mass. App. Div. 43 (App. Div. 2007).
06 See id. at 45.
107 Id. at 43.
1o Id. The counterclaims in the first action included allegations of defects, failure to provide

heat, hot water, smoke detectors, cross-metering of utilities, and unfair and deceptive acts in
violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93(a). Id. The later suit, commenced by the tenant, included
claims for violations of the security deposit statute, breach of the warranty of habitability, crossmetering, and unfair debt collection. Id.
I9 Id. The agreement provided that Doyle would pay back rent and Baltaks would dismiss
the case with prejudice.
110 See id. at 43 (describing trial court's dismissal of all claims except for unfair debt
collection).
III Doyle, 2007 Mass. App. Div. at 45.
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Although the Appellate Division acknowledged the permissive nature of
counterclaims in summary process actions under Rule 5, it held that "the
doctrine of claim preclusion still bars matters that 'were or should have
been adjudicated' in a prior action."1 12 The court also upheld dismissal of
the tenant's claims based on the condition of the apartment, which it found
not only should have been, but actually were, litigated in the summary
process action.'3 By contrast, the court reversed dismissal of the security
deposit claims, reasoning that they were "separate and distinct claims and
may well have been premature at the time of the original summary process
action."' 14
Despite its seemingly broad assertion that claim preclusion
doctrine applies in summary process," 5 the Doyle opinion contains two
important ambiguities: its unexplained reference to small claims actions
and its incomplete delineation of the scope of claim preclusion in summary
process. First, in concluding that summary process actions have claim
preclusive effect, the court explicitly invoked its analogous treatment of
small claims actions.' 1 6 As with summary process proceedings, all
counterclaims in small claims actions are deemed permissive by court
rule.' 7 The Appellate Division has nevertheless held that a defendant in
small claims is prohibited from engaging in claim splitting."18 That is, if
the defendant chooses to raise any counterclaims within the small claims
case, he or she is precluded from raising related claims in any other
forum. 119 Similarly, in Doyle, the court may have intended to limit its
holding to a prohibition against claim splitting in summary process. This
would mean that, as long as the tenant did not raise any counterclaims in
summary process, the action would have no claim preclusive effect. 2°
112

id. at 44 (quoting Bagley v. Moxley, 555 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Mass. 1990)).

" 3 Id. at 45.
114
i.
115 Id. at 44 (quoting Bagley v. Moxley, 555 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Mass. 1990)).
1 6 Doyle, 2007 Mass. App. Div. at 44-45 (citing Donovan v. Ford, 1989 Mass. App. Div.
219, 220 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that doctrine of issue preclusion applied to counterclaims in
small claims actions)).
117 See UNIF. SMALL CLAIMS R. 3(c) (stating "such claims shall not be compulsory").
118 See Woofenden v. Merriam, 1985 Mass. App. Div. 21, 23 (App. Div. 1985) ("While it
was not compulsory on Woofenden to file a counterclaim they elected to do so and must therefore
be bound by the result." (citation omitted)).
119 I.
12 One treatise on Massachusetts housing law recently adopted this intermediate position.
See GEORGE WARSHAW, MASSACHUSETTS LANDLORD-TENANT LAW § 11:12[A] (2d ed. Supp.
2008). It explains the law as follows: "If [the tenant] filed no counterclaims in the housing court
case ... she could freely bring a claim ... in the superior court. If, however, she had asserted
counterclaims in the summary process case then she would have been required to assert all her
claims in that action." Id. Other Massachusetts legal scholars. however, appear to view Doyle as
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Such a limitation would provide a logical reconciliation of Rule 5
with general claim preclusion principles.' 2 ' It would also make the holding
in Doyle compatible with the Appeals Court's dicta in Turner, which
appeared to reject the application of claim preclusion against a tenant who
22
had not raised any counterclaims in his summary process action.
However, in Doyle, the court did not spell out the reasoning behind its
reference to small claims court practice, nor did it explicitly embrace a
claim splitting approach. Therefore, there is no clear indication that the
court intended to limit its holding to the practice of claim splitting, nor that
it was knowingly contradicting
the more expansive approach taken by the
2
trial court in Murray.13
The second ambiguity in the Doyle decision concerns the scope of
24
the claim preclusion principle that the court appears to embrace.1
Presumably, a claim will be precluded if it arises out of the same
"transaction or occurrence"'125 as the summary process case, rather than
being "separate and distinct."'' 26 The security deposit claim at issue in
Doyle was not precluded, in part because the court found it to be both
legally and factually distinct from the earlier summary process case.127 By
contrast, at least one court has suggested that a negligence claim against a
landlord for an injury occurring on the premises would be precluded if not
raised in summary process. 2 These two data points alone, however, do not

mandating a more expansive role for claim preclusion. See MARK G. PERLIN & JOHN M.
CONNORS, HANDBOOK OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE MASSACHUSETTS DISTRICT COURT § 14.27
n.85 (4th ed. 2009) (noting Do le court's acknowledgment of permissive nature of counterclaims
and ncvcrtheless allowing claim preclusion); DAHER & CHOPP, supra note 1, at § 16:13 ("Despite
the permissive nature of counterclaims in summary process cases, however, the doctrine of claim
preclusion still may bar matters that were or should have been adjudicated in a prior action.").
121 Specifically, under the claim splitting approach, both Rule 5 and claim preclusion
principles would have meaningful roles in summary process. Rule 5 would protect tenants from
the effect of claim preclusion so long as no counterclaims were raised; otherwise, ordinary claim
preclusion principles would apply. See supra text accompanying notes 71-78 (describing
possible approaches to reconciling Rule 5 with claim preclusion doctrine).
122 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing Turner court's decision).
123 See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text (discussing Murray court's decision).
124 See Doyle v. Baltaks, 2007 Mass. App. Div. 43, 44-45 (App. Div. 2007).
I 5 MASS. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (defining claims to be treated as compulsory in ordinary civil
proceedings).
126 Dole, 2007 Mass. App. Div. at 45. Although the meaning of "separate and distinct" is
not further clarified by the court, it is presumably intended to be mutually exclusive of the
standard for compulsory counterclaims under Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 13.
127 See id. at 45.
128 See Pedini v. Y & Y Realty, Inc., 1987 Mass. App. Div. 189, 190-91 (App. Div. 1987).
Although worthy of mention, this case is not afforded great weight because it is unclear whether
the court was applying issue or claim preclusion, and because it is not cited in the more recent
Doyle opinion.
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provide enough information to predict what kinds of claims will be viewed
as sufficiently separate and distinct from a summary process case as to
escape preclusion.
One example of a claim whose status remains unsettled is that of
retaliatory eviction for a tenant's complaints about the condition of the
unit. 2 9 Understood broadly, this claim arises out of the central summary
process issue of whether the landlord had a right to possession of the
premises. It would also involve some of the same evidence as the
landlord's claim for possession. There appears to be much room for
continued disagreement on whether such a claim should be3 viewed as a part
of, or separate and distinct from, a summary process case.' 0
Putting aside these ambiguities for the moment, the decisions in
Young, Murrav, and Doyle all indicate that, under current Massachusetts
law, summary process proceedings can reasonably be expected to have
some degree of claim preclusive effect, at least before some trial and
appellate judges.131 Unfortunately, because Massachusetts courts have yet
to articulate a clear rule of decision for when claim preclusion will apply, it
is difficult to predict the outcome of individual cases. Therefore, we now
turn our attention to the treatment of analogous statutes in other
jurisdictions, in order to see whether a sharper image emerges.
C. Out-of-State Comparisons
The disagreement among Massachusetts courts concerning the
preclusive effect of summary process proceedings is not unique.132 State
courts across the country, addressing similar, statutorily-created, expedited
dispossessory proceedings, have come to opposite conclusions on the claim34
33 Even within a single state, confusion can arise.'
preclusion question.'

129 A landlord's retaliatory conduct may form the basis of both a defense against eviction and

a counterclaim for damages. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 2A (2004); see also MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 18 (2003).
130 See generally Chedid v. Lee Street Realty, Inc., 1995 Mass. App. Div. 177, 178 (App.

Div. 1995) (providing another possible source of guidance on question of treatment of retaliatory
eviction claims). Although this case concerned the preclusive effect of a small claims action, the
court did identify circumstances in which a tenant's claims about the condition of the premises
would be distinct enough from a previous dispute that claim preclusion would not apply. See id.
111 See Young v. Estate of Lapolito, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 154, 154 (Super. Ct. 2005) (finding
tenant ownership claim barred by claim preclusion); Murray v. Zullo, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 293, 293
(Super. Ct. 2005) (finding tenant's breach of implied warranty claim barred by claim preclusion);
Doyle v. Baltaks, 2007 Mass. App. Div. 43, 44-45 (App. Div. 2007) (concluding claim preclusion
applies to summary process counterclaims).
132 See in -anote 136 and accompanying text (noting ongoing conflict among Ohio courts).
133 Compare Trust Co. Bank of Nw. Ga. v. Shaw, 355 S.E.2d 99, 100 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
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In Ohio, for example, intermediate-level appellate courts are split on

whether the State's Forcible Entry and Detainer Act135 preserves or
prohibits the application of claim preclusion. 136 The Ohio example is
particularly relevant because the Ohio statute, like Rule 5, has language
appearing to limit the claim preclusive effect of forcible entry and detainer

actions.' 3 7
Thus, consideration of out-of-state precedent is unlikely to resolve
the murkiness in the Massachusetts case law. The degree to which
expedited dispossessory proceedings are intended to displace the traditional

rules of issue and claim preclusion remains a central, unresolved question.
This question is particularly acute in states such as Massachusetts and
Ohio, where a statute or procedural rule governing the expedited
dispossessory proceeding seems to conflict with claim preclusion
principles. 13
State courts simply do not appear to have arrived at a

definitive answer.
Although they may not be able to resolve the conflict surrounding

claim preclusion,

a closer

examination

of certain opinions

from

jurisdictions outside of Massachusetts can provide insight into the
competing views underlying the debate. In attempting to resolve the
apparent tension between statutory language implying rejection of claim
preclusion and traditional claim preclusion principles, courts have

articulated at least two plausible, yet contradictory, interpretations of the
law.

39

Despite each state's unique legislative and common law history, the

(reasoning tenant's claims barred by claim preclusion because "dispossessory proceedings do not
dispense with" claim preclusion rules), with Allen v. Seventy-Seven Acres, 48 Va. Cir. 318, 32122 (1999) (holding claim preclusion did not bar tenant's Virginia Law claims in subsequent
action).
134 See Bruce G. Perrone, West Virginia's New Summay Eviction Proceedings: New
Questions tbr an Old Answer, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 359, 370-72 (1985) (recounting confusion
regarding claim preclusive effect on landlords of new summary process statute).
135 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.01-1923.15 (2004).
136 Compare McAlpine v. Patrick, No. 86453, 2006 WL 562191, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar.
9, 2006) (allowing tenant's claims to survive because claim preclusion was not applicable), with
Forney v. Climbing Higher Enters., Inc., 815 N.E.2d 722, 727 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding that
claim preclusion does not apply); see also Kimberly E. O'Leary, The Inadvisabilityof Applying
PreclusiveDoctrines to Summary Evictions, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 49, 67-72 (1998) (summarizing
conflicting rulings among Ohio courts).
137 See § 1923.03 ("[J]udgments under this chapter are not a bar to a later action brought by
either party.").
138 See id; MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5 ("Counterclaims shall not be considered
compulsory; that is, they shall not be considered waived for the purpose of a separate civil action
or actions if not asserted in a summary process action .... ").
139 Compare McHenry v. Hubbard, 134 P.2d 1107, 1115 (Kan. 1943) (arguing claim
preclusion applied to expedited dispossessory proceeding because it provided full opportunity to
litigate), with J.A.M. Corp. v. AARO Disposal, Inc., 600 N.W.2d 617, 621 (Mich. 1999)
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general attitudes expressed by these out-of-state courts may illuminate the
conflicting preclusion positions in Massachusetts.
In McHenry v. Hubbard,140 the Supreme Court of Kansas issued an
intriguing analysis of the preclusion issue. 14' Kansas considered and
rejected a tenant's attempt to bring suit based on claims that he had
previously raised and litigated as counterclaims in an expedited
dispossessory action. 42 Although the court was not precisely focused on
the issue of claim preclusion, it did provide an interesting argument for the
applicability of general preclusion principles in the context of expedited
dispossessory proceedings. 43 The court acknowledged the relevant Kansas
statute at the time, which provided that judgments in expedited
dispossessory actions "shall not be a bar to any after action brought by
either party." 144 Nevertheless, after a lengthy review of prior decisions and
relevant legislative history, the court concluded that "a more reasonable
interpretation" of this provision was that it protected only those claims that
were impossible to bring in the expedited dispossessory proceeding.145 For
example, a tenant could bring "another action based in part on something
which transpired after the first judgment or on some matter which could not
However,
be joined, or was beyond the justice's jurisdiction . . .. ,
applying the court's reasoning, a claim that could have been raised in the
expedited dispossessory proceeding would still be barred by claim
preclusion.
The McHenry court further concluded that its interpretation of the
statute did not unjustly infringe upon either party's right to a full and fair

(reasoning claim preclusion did not apply because of"swift[]" nature of expedited dispossessory
proceeding).
140 134 P.2d 1107 (Kan. 1943).
141 Id. at 1110-14 (analyzing tenant attempt to bring suit based on previously litigated
counterclaims).
142

See id. at 1108-09.

143 See id

The court focused on issue preclusion, rather than claim preclusion. See id. at

1115 (stating defendant attempted "to again litigate the very facts" resolved in previous case).
McHenrn, provided a justification for finding issue preclusion in the case, however, that applies to
preclusion principles generally and is arguably relevant to the Massachusetts debate. See infra
notes 144-152 (describing relevant aspects of holding).
144 Id. at 1109 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-1303 (1935)).
The Kansas statute at issue in
McHeniy was repealed by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-2606 (1969). Under the current statutory
scheme, at least one court has held that claim preclusion does not apply to a tenant's
counterclaims. See Kincaid v. Sturdevant, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1225 (D. Kan. 2006) (noting
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-3802 (2005) now specifies circumstances under which counterclaims may
be barred in later actions).
145 See McHenrv, 134 P.2d at 1114-15 (outlining statutory interpretation of court).
146 Id. at
1114.
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adjudication of its claims. 147 The court reasoned that both sides had the
opportunity to appeal from the decision in the expedited dispossessory

action. 148 Thus, once Kansas law made it possible to take an appeal from
an expedited dispossessory proceeding, it 49nullified any equitable
justification for a broader reading of the statute.1
In sum, on the McHenry court's view, statutory language indicating
that expedited dispossessory proceedings will not be a "bar" to later actions
should be interpreted as merely reinforcing traditional claim preclusion
principles. 150 Such proceedings will have claim preclusive effect to the
extent that claims could have been raised in that proceeding.' 5 '
Furthermore, in light of a tenant's right to appeal from an adverse judgment

in an expedited dispossessory proceeding, there is no significant concern
that a tenant's valid claims will be unjustly denied or ignored by the
courts.

152

In contrast, J.A.M Corp. v. AARO Disposal, Inc.,' 53 presents a
starkly different vision of the role of claim preclusion in expedited
dispossessory proceeding. In J.A.M Corp., the Supreme Court of Michigan
held that claim preclusion would not bar claims that a tenant could have,
but failed to raise in an earlier expedited dispossessory proceeding. 154 The
court based its decision on a portion of the statute governing expedited
dispossessory proceedings, which, like the Kansas statute in McHenry,
provides that "[a] judgment for possession under this chapter does not
merge or bar any other claim for relief."' 55 Unlike McHenry, however, the
Michigan Supreme Court interpreted this provision as evidence of

141 Id. at 1115 (stating defendant could have but failed to "perfect" his appeal from expedited

dispossessory proceeding).
148 See id at 1107 (noting statutory amendment allowing for appeal).
149

"'

id.

See McHenry, 134 P.2d at 1114-15 (interpreting statute to protect only claims tenant

could not have raised in expedited dispossessory proceeding). Claim preclusion only applies to
claims that could have been raised in the earlier action. See supra note 7 and accompanying text
(explaining traditional scope of claim preclusion); see also Bradford v. Richards, 417 N.E.2d
1234, 1235 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (noting claim not barred because prior proceeding "had no
jurisdiction over the settlement of estates"). Thus, the McHenry court did not diverge from basic
claim preclusion principles in suggesting that an expedited dispossessory proceeding judgment
would not preclude claims based on events "which transpired after the first judgment," or other
claims that could not have been joined to the earlier action. 134 P.2d at 1114-15.
... McHenry, 134 P.2dat 1114-15.
52 See id. at 1115.
153 600 N.W.2d 617 (Mich. 1999).
114 See id. at 621-22.
155 Id. at 621 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5750 (2000)). The statute does bar
some claims involving forfeiture of an executory land sale contract, which are not relevant here.
§ 600.5750.
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legislative intent to take expedited dispossessory proceedings "outside the
realm of the normal rules concerning merger and bar in order that attorneys
would not be obliged to fasten all other pending claims to the swiftly
moving summary proceedings." 116
On this alternative view, the McHenry court was wrong to interpret
statutory language indicating that expedited dispossessory proceedings will

not be a bar to later actions as mere reinforcement of traditional claim
preclusion principles.1 57 Rather, according to the J.A.M Corp. court, this
language is intended to remove claim preclusion from such proceedings all
together. 58 Indeed, the very purpose of an expedited proceeding would be
undermined if lawyers felt obliged to append a multitude of related claims,
lest they be barred by claim preclusion from raising them in a separate
action. The J.A.M Corp. court's reasoning about the speedy nature of
these proceedings could also be extended to challenge the McHenry court's
conclusion that appellate review is sufficient to guarantee a full and fair
adjudication of all claims. This is because, in a "swiftly moving"
proceeding, there may be a greater risk that the factual record for appeal
will be flawed or incomplete. 159 One scholar, for example, has argued that
the shortened timeline in Ohio dispossessory proceedings can hamper fact

gathering.

60

156J.A.M. Corp., 600 N.W.2d at 621.
157 Compare McHenry, 134 P.2d at 1114 (interpreting language to mean judgment bars all
but claims "which could not be joined"), with J.A.M Corp., 600 N.W.2d at 621-22 (interpreting
language to mean "judgment ...does not bar other claims for relief').
"' See J.A.M Corp., 600 N.W.2d at 621 ("Plainly the Legislature took [expedited
dispossessory proceedings] outside the realm of the normal rules concerning merger and bar in
order that attorneys would not be obliged to fasten all other pending claims to the swiftly moving
summary proceedings.").
159See O'Leary, supra note 136, at 74 ("[G]iven the expedited nature of the [Ohio
dispossessory] action, there simply is not sufficient time to engage in thorough fact-finding before
a possession hearing.").
160 See id. O'Leary's article illustrates the difficulties facing a tenant in the early days of a
summary process action:
A[n expedited dispossessory] action moves very quickly ....[A] tenant who learns of
the intent of a landlord to evict on day one may be required to present defenses to that
eviction on day ten. During those ten days, the tenant must make an appointment with
a lawyer, or prepare to defend him or herself, and analyze the complaint .... Also
during that ten days, information must be uncovered or discovered, witnesses procured,
and documents obtained. It is not difficult to understand how defenses to possession
actions might be less than adequately presented - witnesses may be unavailable,
documents unobtainable, and people unwilling to talk. The normal time frame in
which to conduct discovery must be shortened by leave of court and, given the
expedited nature of the action, there simply is not sufficient time to engage in thorough
fact-finding before a possession hearing.
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The McHenry and J.A.M. Corp. opinions demonstrate that a court
can conceive of a statutory scheme creating expedited dispossessory
proceedings in at least two ways. On one view, the statute creates a special
proceeding that, to the greatest extent possible, mirrors the claim preclusion
principles of ordinary cases.' 6' On the other view, the statute creates a
special proceeding whose characteristics make the application of claim
preclusions principles of ordinary cases inappropriate. 62
Statutory
language indicating that judgments in such proceedings will not bar later
actions does not decisively settle this debate.
D. Conclusionsfrom the Case Law
A review of judicial precedent both within and beyond
Massachusetts has left us with surprisingly little guidance as to the likely
claim preclusive effect of a given summary process action.
A
Massachusetts court deciding whether to allow a tenant to bring claims that
could have been raised in an earlier summary process proceeding appears
to have at least three options. First, a court may conclude that claim
preclusion principles apply in full, in which case all of the tenant's claims
arising out of the tenancy will be barred. 163 Second, a court may conclude
that claim preclusion principles do not apply at all, in which case none of
the tenant's claims will be barred unless they were actually litigated in the
summary process proceeding. 64 Third, a court may conclude that only the
claim preclusion rule against claim splitting applies, in which case all of
the tenant's claims arising out of the tenancy will be barred if any one of
them was raised in the summary process proceeding.1 65 Although the third
option is perhaps most likely given recent guidance from the Massachusetts
Appellate Division, 66 all three approaches appear to have support in the

Id.
161 See supra notes 140-152 and accompanying text (summarizing the McHenrv approach).
162 See supra notes 153-156 and accompanying text (summarizing the J.A.M. Corp.
approach).
163 See Murray v. Zullo, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 293, 293 (Super. Ct. 2005) (granting defendant
landlord's motion for summary judgment); McHenry v. Hubbard, 134 P.2d 1107, 1114-15 (Kan.
1943) (reasoning plaintiff forfeited opportunity to assert claims by failing to raise them in
previous proceedings).
164 See Turner v. Cmty. Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 816 N.E. 2d 537, 544 n. 12 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2004) (suggesting MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5 may protect all tenant claim from claim
preclusion); J.A.M. Corp. v. AARO Disposal, Inc., 600 N.W.2d 617, 621-22 (Mich. 1999)
(holding claim preclusion rules did not bar plaintiff tenants claims).
165 See Doyle v. Baltaks, 2007 Mass. App. Div. 43, 44-45 (App. Div. 2007) (dismissing

claims of plaintiff tenant who had engaged in claim splitting).
166 See supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text (suggesting a rule against claim splitting
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case law. 167 These variant positions arise out of conflicting interpretations
of expedited dispossessory proceedings in light of traditional claim
preclusion principles.
From this web of legal precedent, however, at least one conclusion
can be safely drawn: claim preclusion may apply to bar tenants from
bringing claims that they failed to raise in previous summary process
proceedings. 168 Of course, for tenants, the consequences of this fact will
depend on individual judges' interpretations of the law as well as the
circumstances of their particular cases. For policymakers, judges and
lawyers, however, the consequence is more clear: the risk of claim
preclusion cannot be ignored in the development or application of the
summary process device.
IV. MISGUIDED RELIANCE ON RULE 5 IN THE LEGAL
COMMUNITY
Under current Massachusetts case law, there is no clear or
consistently enforced degree of protection for tenants in summary process
proceedings from the effects of claim preclusion. Nevertheless, both
housing court practitioners and judges appear to act on the assumption that
such protection exists.169 Although this assumption relies on an all together
reasonable reading of the summary process rules and statute, it is not the
reading shared by the three Massachusetts courts discussed in the previous
section. 170 The result is a lose-lose situation for tenants.
A court may dismiss any claims tenants have against their
landlords on claim preclusion grounds if not raised in summary process.171
as likely interpretation of Doyle holding).
167 See supra notes 81-131 and accompanying text (surveying Massachusetts case law).
"" See Doyle, 2007 Mass. App. Div. at 44-45 (concluding claim preclusion applies to
summary process counterclaims); Murray v. Zullo, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 293, 293 (super. Ct. 2005)
(finding tenant's breach of implied warranty claim barred by claim preclusion); Young v. Estate
of Lapolito, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 154, 154 (Super. Ct. 2005) (finding tenant ownership claim barred
by claim preclusion).
169 See

STEFANIE

BALANDIS

ET

AL.,

LEGAL

TACTICS:

TENANTS'

RIGHTS

IN

MASSACHUSETTS: PRIVATE HOUSING (Annette R. Duke ed., 7th ed. 2008) (consisting of housing

law guide written by practitioners omitting issue of claim preclusion); Restoration Hous. Corp. v.
Wilson, No. 97-03620, slip op. at 2 (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order Oct. 2, 1997) (expressing view that
claim preclusion does not apply); see also infra notes 180-185, 192 and accompanying text
(describing attitudes of housing court practitioners and judges).
170 See supra note 168. But see Turner v. Cmty. Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 816 N.E. 2d 537,
544 n. 12 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (reversing summary judgment and suggesting claim preclusion
may be inapplicable).
171 See supra note 168 (observing cases where tenants' claims were dismissed because
claims were not raised in previous proceedings).
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At the same time, however, those parties within the summary process
proceeding who are most capable of correcting or minimizing the harm to
tenants from this claim preclusion regime are largely unaware of the
danger.'
This blindness among members of the legal community poses a
threat to tenants' rights that is equal to, if not greater than, claim preclusion
itself.
A. Legal Service Providers
Perhaps the most significant example of reliance on Rule 5 as a
protection for tenants in summary process is among those who represent
them. Many tenants facing eviction in Massachusetts turn to legal services
providers, either for full representation or for self-help advice.7 3 Statistics
from Greater Boston Legal Services ("GBLS") provide some indication of
the significant role such organizations play. 174 GBLS attorneys offer a
variety of free legal services to low-income individuals in and around
Boston.175 With respect to summary process actions, GBLS offers full
representation in certain cases in addition to clinics at the housing court and
at their own facilities each week. 76 During these sessions tenants can get
advice about defending against evictions pro se.177 In 2008, GBLS'
housing unit alone handled approximately 4,018 individual cases.171
No comprehensive survey exists of the strategies pursued by
individual legal services providers, and indeed practices are likely to vary
based on the resources available to the attorneys at a particular time and the
needs of a given client. However, a useful indicator of common practice

172 See supra note 169 (identifying presumption of claim preclusion protection).
173 In the Boston area alone, such providers include: Greater Boston Legal Services, see

Housing Unit, http://www.gbls.org/housing/representation.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2010); the
Volunteer Lawyers Project, see Volunteer Opportunities, http://www.vlpnet.org/volunteer/ (last
visited Jan. 10, 2010); the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau, see Practice Areas,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hlab/practice.php (last visited Jan. 10, 2010); and the
WilmerHale
Legal
Services
Center,
see
Overview
of
Services,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/clinical/lsc/help/overview.htin (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
174 GREATER BOSTON LEGAL SERVICES, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2008), available at
http://www.gbls.org/Report.htm.
175 See Greater Boston Legal Services, Types of Services, http://www.gbls.org/service.htm
(last visited Jan. 10, 2010); see also Service Area, http://www.gbls.org/area.htm (last visited Jan.
10, 2010).
176 See Greater Boston Legal Services, Types of Services, supra note 175 (outlining services
provided by GBLS).
177See Housing Unit, supra note 173 (describing GBLS Housing Unit services).
178 See GREATER BOSTON LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 174, at 6 (providing statistics about

GBLS Housing Unit).
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can be found in Legal Tactics: Tenants' Rights in Massachusetts.17 9 This
self-help guide to Massachusetts landlord tenant law is written and edited
by many of the leaders of organizations providing both free and paid legal
services to Massachusetts tenants.""' On the issue of counterclaims, Legal
Tactics does not reference any of the cases in which Massachusetts courts
have applied claim preclusion to tenant counterclaims; indeed, it quite
explicitly relies on the assumption that claim preclusion will not apply.' 8'
Citing to Rule 5, it instructs tenants as follows: "If you have a claim against
your landlord and you do not bring it as a counterclaim in an eviction case,
you still have the right to file a separate lawsuit on that claim."' 18 2 The
guide then goes on to suggest that tenants not bring personal injury and
lead paint poisoning claims in summary process proceedings. 8 3 It points
out that such claims can prove to be very legally complex and that more
time may be desirable to allow for injuries to fully develop. 8 4 Tenants
following the advice of Legal Tactics, therefore, would likely be making
but not
themselves most vulnerable to claim preclusion by raising some,
85
all, of their counterclaims in their summary process proceedings.
See BALANDIS ET AL., supra note 169.
180 The authors of this housing law guide for tenants include: a senior housing attorney at
GBLS, the Managing Attorney of the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau, and a private attorney who also
teaches landlord/tenant law clinics for the National Lawyers Guild Street Law Project. See
Stefanie Balandis, http://www.linkedin.com/pub/b/646/716 (last visited Jan. 10, 2010); Clinical
Staff, http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hlab/aboutclinical.php (last visited Jan. 10,
2010); Jeffrey M. Feuer, http://www.goldsteinandfeuer.com/Attorneys.shtml/2183505_1 (last
visited Jan. 10, 2010).
181 See BALANDIS ET AL., supra note 169, at 227.
179

IX2
184

Id.
id at 227-28.
Id. A similar approach is reflected in the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau's Summary Process

Manual for its attorneys. See HARVARD LEGAL AID BUREAU, SUMMARY PROCESS MANUAL
204-05 (Andrew D. O'Toole ed., 1998). Relying on Rule 5, the manual reasons that the only risk
of preclusion would come from inadvertently litigating the personal injury claim in summary
process, thereby making it subject to issue preclusion in a subsequent case. Id. The manual does,
however, recommend that an attorney "inform the opponent in writing ... that the tenant intends
to bring a separate suit." Id. at 205. Such a precaution might be sufficient to protect the tenant
from the effects of claim preclusion if it could be argued that the landlord tacitly consented to the
claim splitting. See. e.g., Diversified Mortg. Investors v. Viking General Corp., 450 N.E.2d 176,
179 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(l)(a) (1980) for
the proposition that "a party may consent effectively to the separate litigation of related claims").
But see 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4415 (3d ed. 1998) ("It is not even safe for a plaintiff to attempt an
express reservation of part of the claim in the complaint, relying on the absence of objection to
preserve a second action.").
185 At least two Massachusetts courts, including an appellate court, have applied claim
preclusion to claim splitting, where a tenant raises some, but not all, of their claims in summary
process. See Young v. Estate of Lapolito, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 154, 154 (Super. Ct. 2005); Doyle v.
Baltaks, 2007 Mass. App. Div. 43, 44-45 (App. Div. 2007). Only one Massachusetts court has
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Admittedly, the risk of claim preclusion may not be of great
concern to most tenants, who are primarily interested in maintaining
possession of their units. 186 These tenants are unlikely to have the
resources necessary for pursuing affirmative suits against their landlords in
the future.187 Furthermore, in preparing self-help advice for tenants, Legal
Tactics must balance legal accuracy against clarity and focus of
presentation. In light of these concerns, it may well not make sense to
include the intricacies of claim preclusion doctrine in a self-help guide.
Nevertheless, the guide's clear assertion that claim preclusion will not
apply, as well as its willingness to encourage claim splitting by tenants,
appears to reflect a degree of confidence among advocates that Rule 5 will
protect tenants from the effects of claim preclusion.' 88
The Legal Tactics example strongly suggests that attorneys
representing tenants in summary process cases are not generally accounting
for the risk of claim preclusion when formulating their defense strategies.
Of course, whatever weaknesses may exist in the strategies of attorneys, it
is even more likely that tenants do not account for these risks when they act
without legal advice.189 The basic assumption that tenants will be protected
applied claim preclusion to a tenant who omitted all counterclaims in summary process. See
Murray v. Zullo, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 293, 293 (App. Div. 2005). The former practice therefore
appears most dangerous for tenants under current Massachusetts law. Id.
186 See LEWIS POWELL, BOSTON BAR ASS'N TASK FORCE ON EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT
TO COUNSEL, GIDEON'S NEW TRUMPET: EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
MASSACHUSETTS
8-9
(September
2008),
available
at
http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/nr0809/GideonsNewTrumpet.pdf (describing the importance of
preserving one's shelter when faced with eviction).
187 See id. at 3 (noting that most tenants facing eviction are unrepresented).
188 See supra notes 179-185 and accompanying text.
189 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, REPORT
TO
THE
HOUSE
OF
DELEGATES
9-10
(2006),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A 112A.pdf
(resolution
urging
governments to provide legal counsel as of right in certain civil cases). In advocating for a right
to counsel in at least certain civil contexts, including housing cases, the American Bar
Association has presented a grim view of pro se litigants' abilities to represent themselves in
legal proceedings:
The American system of justice is inherently and perhaps inevitably adversarial and
complex. It assigns to the parties the primary and costly responsibilities of finding the
controlling legal principles and uncovering the relevant facts, following complex rules
of evidence and procedure and presenting the case in a cogent fashion to the judge or
jury. Discharging these responsibilities ordinarily requires the expertise lawyers spend
three years of graduate education and more years of training and practice acquiring.
With rare exceptions, non-lawyers lack the knowledge, specialized expertise and skills
to perform these tasks and are destined to have limited success no matter how valid
their position may be, especially if opposed by a lawyer. Not surprisingly, studies
consistently show that legal representation makes a major difference in whether a party
wins in cases decided in the courts.
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from the effects of claim preclusion is not unreasonable, or even surprising,
in light of the facially straightforward language of Rule 5.190 Nevertheless,
as the recent Massachusetts case law suggests, this degree of confidence

among attorneys is almost certainly no longer warranted.1 91
B. Judges in Summary Process Cases

Unsurprisingly, legal practitioners are not alone in regarding
summary process counterclaims as immune from claim preclusion. The
courts in which they practice appear to share this assumption.

For

example, one housing court judge dismissing a tenant's summary process
counterclaims, stated: "The defendant can certainly bring an independent
complaint since counterclaims in summary process are merely permissive
and not compulsory."'

92

As was seen with respect to legal service

providers, Rule 5 appears to have also given housing court judges
unwarranted confidence that tenants' summary process counterclaims will
be protected from the effects of claim preclusion. This section reviews two

areas of judicial determination in which courts' apparent reliance on Rule 5
may unduly prejudice tenants.
1. Motions to Amend Answers

In summary process, any counterclaims not included in a tenant's
answer are deemed waived "unless the court shall otherwise order on
motion for cause shown."' 193 Answers are due within a week of the date on
which the landlord enters the action with the court. 194 Even assuming a

Id.; see also POWELL, supra note 186, at 8-9 (describing need for legal representation in
Massachusetts summary process cases).
190 Compare BALANDIS ET AL., supra note 169 (neglecting to address claim preclusion), with
MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5 (stating counterclaims not compulsory in summary process
actions).
191 See supra Part III (surveying Massachusetts case law regarding claim preclusion in
summary process proceedings).
192 Restoration Hous. Corp. v. Wilson, No. 97-03620, slip op. at 2 (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order
Oct. 2, 1997); see also Ednson Realty Trust v. Robinson, No. 88-SP-7252-C, slip op. at 4-5
(Hous. Ct. Dep't Order Nov. 21, 1988) (suggesting tenant counterclaims are governed by MASS.
R. Civ. P. 13 (b), which would protect these claims from preclusion).
193 MASS UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5; see also Morrison v. Estrella, No. 07H84SP002357,
slip op. at 1 (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order Feb. 27, 2008) (allowing tenant's motion to amend in part
and denying in part); Turner v. Settle, No. 06-CV-00029, slip op. at 1 (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order
Mar. 31, 2006) (allowing defendant's motion to amend answer and add counterclaim); CMJ v.
Stallworth, No. 98-04095, slip op. at 2 (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order Sept. 8, 1998) (allowing tenant's
motion to amend counterclaim).
194 MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 3 (outlining timetable for summary process
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tenant is able to obtain legal advice, this expedited schedule does not allow
much time to thoroughly identify and develop possible counterclaims by
the time the initial answer is due.195 Tenants may therefore find it
necessary to seek the court's permission to amend their answers
in order to
96
include valid counterclaims that were inadvertently omitted.1
Claim preclusion can apply even against a party who attempted to
include counterclaims in an unsuccessful motion to amend. 197 Judicial
willingness to grant motions to amend is thus a crucial element in
protecting tenants from the detrimental effects of claim preclusion. At the
very least, courts should weigh the threat of claim preclusion when
considering motions to amend answers. However, comparing decisions
from general civil practice and summary process proceedings, it appears
that courts in summary process are relatively insensitive to the risks facing
tenants whose motions to amend are denied. 9'
In ordinary practice, motions to amend are to be "freely given."' 99
This rule reflects an "expressed tendency . . . in favor of allowing
amendments, and a motion to amend should be allowed unless some good
reason appears for denying it.",200 The Massachusetts Court of Appeals has
suggested, however, that this generally liberal attitude should be tempered
in summary process, where "time is of the essence" and the goal is to
achieve a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every summary
process action.",20 As the court reasoned, this "objective is defeated if the

proceeeding). In an eviction for nonpayment of rent, a tenant must receive fourteen days notice
of termination of the tenancy. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, §§ 11-12 (2003). The landlord
can then serve him or her with summary process and, as few as seven days later, enter the action
with the court. MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 2(b). Under such circumstances, the tenant will
have a total of 29 days from notice of eviction until the answer is due. Id.
195 This risk has been recognized in the context of similarly expedited eviction procedures.
See O'Leary, supra note 136, at 74 ("given the expedited nature of the action, there simply is not
sufficient time to engage in thorough fact-finding before a possession hearing"); Jerrold B. Winer,
Pro Se Aspects of Hampden County Housing Court: Helping People Help Themselves, 17 URB.
L. ANN. 71, 78 (1979) (noting few properly filed summary process answers in Hampden Housing
Court under expedited local rules).
196 See supra notes 193-195 and accompanying text (discussing amendment of counterclaim
during summary process)
197 See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 841 N.E.2d 287, 288-89 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006)
(holding claim preclusion applied despite party's attempted amendment to pleading);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. b (1982) (stating unsuccessful attempt to
amend does not protect denied amendments from claim preclusion).
198 See infra notes 199-204 (comparing treatment of motions to amend in general civil
practice and summary process).
199 MASS. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
200 Castellucci v. U. S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 361 N.E.2d 1264, 1265 (Mass. 1977).
201 MASS. UN1F. SUMM. PROCESS R. I and commentary; see also Hodge v. Klug, 604 N.E.2d
1329, 1335 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (asserting liberal claim amendment rules "tempered" by MASS.
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pleadings are susceptible of late amendments which alter the agenda of the
trial. 20 2 Consistent with this reasoning, a tenant may be denied the right to
amend in summary process, particularly if his or her motion is brought only
shortly before trial.20 3 In one case, the court denied a tenant's request to
file a late answer and counterclaims at trial, even though she claimed that
she had no attorney on the day the answer was due.2 °4
Denials of tenants' motions to amend may be warranted in
particular cases. 205 It is troubling, however, that courts appear to apply a
stricter standard for motions to amend in summary process. 20 6 One
explanation for this fact is that courts in summary process cases may view
summary process as a limited proceeding without claim preclusive effect,
where the opportunity to fully litigate all claims can be sacrificed in order
to achieve a speedy determination on the issue of possession.20 7 Courts in
subsequent actions, however, may assume that the summary process case
was a comprehensive proceeding that can fairly be given full preclusive
effect. 20 ' These inconsistent assumptions are to the detriment of the tenant,
whose ability to litigate claims could be consciously circumscribed by the
summary process court, only to be treated as exhausted by later courts.

UNIF. SUMM. PROCESss R. 1); Cambridge Chamber of Commerce v. Cent. Square Ins. Agency,
Inc., 1999 Mass. App. Div. 27, 31 (App. Div. 1999) (stating motion to amend on day of trial may
warrant denial, "particularly" in summary process).
202 Hodge, 604 N.E.2d at 1335.
201 See id.at 1335-36 (affirming denial of tenant's motion to amend counterclaim on day of
trial); GML Corp. v. Massey, 2007 Mass. App. Div. 143, 144 (App. Div. 2007) (denying tenant's
untimely motion to amend).
204 Bldg. 42 Assocs. v. Russo, No. 02-02502 (Hous. Ct. Dep't. Order June 25, 2002).
205 In Hodge, for example, the tenant was represented by counsel and the long, tortuous
history of the case led the court to conclude that the tenant had "attempted to manipulate the
summary process procedure and ha[d] misused statutory and regulatory protections for tenants in
rental housing." 604 N.E.2d at 1336.
206 Compare Castellucci v. U. S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 361 N.E.2d 1264, 1265 (Mass. 1977)
(describing "expressed tendency ... in favor of allowing amendments" in general civil practice),
with Hodge v. Klug, 604 N.E.2d 1329, 1335 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (stating this "liberal attitude"
is "tempered" in summary process).
207 See supra note 192 (observing housing court cases expressing view summary process
does not have claim preclusive effect); see also Boston Hous. Auth. v. O'Hannisian, No. 06-SP031789, slip op. at 2-3 (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order Apr. 6, 2007) (severing tenant's counterclaims lest
they "distract the jury from the central issues to be decided"); CMJ v. Stallworth, No. 98-04095,
slip op. at 1-2 (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order Sept. 8. 1998) (granting plaintiffs motion to strike
counterclaim because it would distract from the central issue). But see Lakewood Village, LLC
v. Connors, No. 06-SP-031789, slip op. at I (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order March 23, 2005) (allowing
tenant claims despite recognizing "landlord's right to expeditious determination of the summary
process case").
208 See supra notes 90-130 and accompanying text (reviewing recent Massachusetts cases in
which summary process proceedings were given claim preclusive effect).
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2. Motions to Dismiss or Sever Counterclaims
Even assuming a tenant is able to raise all valid counterclaims in a
summary process answer, these claims still face an additional danger:

dismissal or severance.

Courts retain discretion to dismiss or sever

counterclaims "which cannot appropriately be heard as part of the summary
process action. ,,209 Under either procedure, the tenant is forced to litigate
his or her counterclaims in a separate forum. 2
Dismissal is more

burdensome than severance, however, because the tenant must take the
additional steps of initiating the second action. 21I For indigent tenants,

severance or dismissal may well mean the end of the road for their claims.
Many tenants lack both the expertise and resources to successfully pursue a

separate action in small claims court without representation.21 2 At the same
time, free legal services providers may be unwilling to dedicate their scarce
attorney power to such affirmative suits. 21 3
Therefore, keeping

counterclaims within the summary process case is essential to ensuring that
tenants may fully litigate their claims.

In order to understand how courts generally exercise their
discretion in this area, it is helpful to begin with the full text from the
commentary to Rule 5 upon which they rely:

Because counterclaims are not compulsory, the court
retains discretion to sever a counterclaim which cannot
Commentary to MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5.
210 See MASS. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (3) and (c) (providing for dismissal of counterclaim without
209

prejudice on the basis of improper venue); MASS. R. CIV. P. 42 (b) and (c) (providing for separate
trial of severed claims).
211 See Akers v. Hall, No. 06-0202, slip op. at 2 (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order June 28, 2006)
(Abrashkin, J.). The housing court judge in Akers recently explained his preference for severance
over dismissal:
It appears to me that judicial and administrative economy will be served by severing,
rather than dismissing, the tenant's counterclaims from the case in chief .... Those
counterclaims can then be tried separately under Mass.R.Civ.P. 42(b). This approach
will not prejudice the landlord-his right to a clean and prompt up-or-down
determination on cause will be preserved. The court intends this order to establish the
functional equivalent of a separate civil action on the tenant's counterclaims, and only
seeks to avoid the additional time, expense, and duplicated paperwork involved in
commencing and managing such a separate action.
Id.
212 See Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing
Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 367, 384-85 (2008) (describing the
significant limitations facing pro se litigants as "beyond dispute").
213 See POWELL, supra note 186, at 9 (stating "housing cases are high on the list of unmet
legal needs").
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appropriately be heard as part of the summary process
action. It would, however, appear to be contrary to the law
to sever a counterclaim which is being relied upon as a
defense under G.L. c. 239, § 8A.214
The first clause, which qualifies all of the court's discretion, merits
emphasis: "Because counterclaims are not compulsory., 215 The court in
Marrotto v. Naumann216 articulated the logical relationship between
dismissal or severance and the permissive nature of the counterclaim. 217 In
affirming dismissal of counterclaims improperly raised in a summary
process proceeding, the court explained that the tenant would not be
prejudiced because the claims were permissive under Rule 5.218 The tenant
2 19
therefore "remain[ed] free to pursue counterclaims in a separate suit.,
Courts in summary process cases are aware that Rule 5 governs
their discretion to sever or dismiss counterclaims 220 They also appear to
assume that Rule 5 is the end of the story because it classifies all
counterclaims as permissive and its commentary suggests that all
counterclaims as severable unless raised as a defense under section 8A.22t
For example, courts typically sever or dismiss counterclaims raised in for
cause evictions where section 8A defenses are not applicable.222 However,
Rule 5 is not the end of the story because in spite of Rule 5, a court in a
subsequent action may find certain of a tenant's counterclaims to have been
compulsory.22 3 Therefore, courts adjudicating a summary process case
214 Commentary to MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5.
215 id
216 1999 Mass. App. Div. 35 (App. Div. 1999).
217 Id. at 37 n.4.
218 id.
219 Id.
220 See, e.g., Clarendon Residences, LLC v. Zand, No. 071H84SP000817, slip op. at 5 (Hous.
Ct. Dep't Order Dec. 7, 2007) (citing Rule 5); Akers v. Hall, No. 06-SP-0202 (Hous. Ct. Dep't
Order June 28, 2006) (same); Ednson Realty Trust v. Robinson, No. 88-SP-7252-C, slip op. at 5
(Hous. Ct. Dep't Order Nov. 21, 1988) (same).
221 See MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5 ("Counterclaims shall not be considered
compulsory ....); MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 5 cmt. ("Because counterclaims are not
compulsory, the court retains discretion to sever a counterclaim which cannot appropriately be
heard as part of the summary process action. It would, however, appear to be contrary to the law
to sever a counterclaim which is being relied upon as a defense under G.L. c. 239, § 8A.").
222 See, e.g., Beacon Residential Mgmt. v. Spitzer, No. 07-01101, slip op. at 2 (Hous. Ct.
Dep't Order Apr. 6, 2007) (reasoning that counterclaims would "distract from the central issues to
be decided" in the case); Sylvestre v. Harris, No. 06-1053 (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order Apr. 27, 2006)
(dismissing counterclaims that are readily separable from rest of case); Urban Edge Property
Mgmt. v. Garcia-Perez, No. 05-02436, slip op. at 2-3 (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order Sept. 13, 2005)
(dismissing counterclaims as they would require additional proof at trial).
223See supra notes 90-130 and accompanying text (reviewing Massachusetts cases in which

36

SUFFOLKJOURNAL OF TRIAL

& APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XV

should take a more restrained approach towards severance and dismissal of
counterclaims, consistent with the treatment of compulsory counterclaims
in other contexts.224
This problem with dismissal and severance presents yet another
example of how misguided reliance on Rule 5 in contemporary legal
practice disadvantages tenants. Overall, there is a dramatic and troubling

disconnect between the attitude of the legal community in summary
process proceedings and the actual treatment of tenants in subsequent
actions. In summary process, counterclaims are assumed to be permissive,

and thus lawyers do not counsel their clients to raise all claims arising out
of the tenancy. 225 At the same time, as this section illustrates, courts are
more likely to frustrate tenants' attempts to pursue those claims by denying
motions to amend and by dismissing or severing counterclaims. By

contrast, in subsequent actions, counterclaims are assumed to have been
compulsory and the summary process proceeding is treated as a full, fair
226
and final opportunity to litigate claims between the parties.
Consequently, basic claim preclusion principles bar tenants attempting to
raise new counterclaims. 227 The net effect of this confusion is that tenants
may never have the opportunity to litigate potentially valid claims against
their landlords in any forum. This outcome cannot have been an intended
result of either the statutory summary process procedure or claim
preclusion doctrine.
V. PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TENANT ATTORNEYS
There is ample room for disagreement over the proper
interpretation of Rule 5, as well as the broader policy question of how

tenant claims were precluded because compulsory in prior summary process proceeding).
224 See, e.g., Trenz v. Family Dollar Stores of Mass., Inc., 900 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2009) ("Actions such as the present case, involving claims between the same parties that arise
out of the same contractual relationship and which could have been raised as claims and
counterclaims in a single action, are particularly suitable for consolidation." (citations
ommitted)); Kimball v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1999 Mass. App. Div. 298, 299 (App. Div. 1999)
(describing limited circumstances under which severance of claims is appropriate).
225 See supra notes 173-187 (noting view among housing court lawyers that not all
counterclaims need be raised in summary process).
226 See Murray v. Zullo 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 293, 295 (Super. Ct. 2005) (asserting summary
process action was proper proceeding to raise counterclaims); supra notes 90-130 and
accompanying text (surveying recent cases where summary process proceedings precluded
plaintiff tenant's claims).
227 See Heacock v. Heacock, 520 N.E.2d 151, 152-53 (Mass. 1988) ("The doctrine of claim
preclusion makes a valid, final judgment conclusive on the parties and their privies, and bars
further litigation of all matters that were or should have been adjudicated in the action.") (citing
Franklin v. N. Weymouth Coop. Bank, 283 Mass. 275, 279-80 (1933)).
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claim preclusion and counterclaim practice should be reconciled in
summary process.228 Interesting as these issues may be, they are not of
primary concern to the tenants presently involved in summary process
proceedings. Focusing on the needs of tenants today, this final section
identifies ways tenant attorneys can mitigate, and even capitalize upon, the
claim preclusion risks that their clients face in the current legal climate.
A. Best Practices in Summary Process
There are several important steps that tenant attorneys can take before, during, and after their clients' summary process cases - to mitigate
Underlying all of these
the negative effects of claim preclusion.
recommendations is the general principle that attorneys must revise their
The compulsory counterclaim rule governing
working assumptions.
ordinary civil practice may apply to summary process proceedings.
Therefore, any counterclaims arising out of the tenancy should be assumed
to be compulsory absent explicit recognition to the contrary by the court in
a particular case. Starting from this premise, attorneys should be properly
conscious of the precautions that must be taken in all aspects of their
representation.
I. Protecting Clients from the Effects of Claim Preclusion
In litigating summary process cases, tenant attorneys should take
all possible steps to ensure that their clients do not inadvertently waive
valid legal claims. Although this task may sound daunting, it will, in most
circumstances, require only minor adjustments to routine practice. First,
attorneys should counsel their clients to raise all counterclaims arising out
228

One academic review of Ohio law presents compelling doctrinal and policy arguments

against applying claim preclusion to any summary process counterclaims. See O'Leary, supra
note 136, at 72-91. Scholars have also debated for many years the broader question of whether,
and to what extent, tenant counterclaims should be available at all in summary process. See
generally, Rafael Mares, Enforcement of the Massachusetts Lead Law and Its Effect on Rental
Price.s and Abandonment, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv. L. 343 (2003)
(presenting an economic defense of vigorous lead paint law enforcement, including through
summary process counterclaims); Lawrence K. Kolodney, Eviction Free Zones: The Economics
of Legal Bricolage in the Fight Against Displacement, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 509-12

(1991) (arguing for the use of summary process counterclaims to fight gentrification); Richard H.
Chused, Contemporary Dilemmas of the Javins Defense: A Note on the Need fir Procedural
Reform in Landlord-Tenant Law, 67 GEO. L.J. 1385, 1390 (1979) (arguing that expansion of
summary process counterclaims must be balanced by an equitable procedure for settling
possession prior to judgment); Samuel Bassett Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and
Tenant Remedies. An Integration, 56 B.U. L. REV. 1, 126-28 (1976) (critiquing the use of
summary process counterclaims to enforce housing codes).

38

SUFFOLKJOURNAL OF TRIAL

& APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XV

of the tenancy in their summary process answers if there is no risk of
prejudice from doing so. This step is the easiest and safest way to preserve
a tenant's right to litigate all claims. There may be situations, however, in
which other practical considerations weigh against raising a particular
counterclaim. For example, if a tenant's children have been exposed to
lead paint in the apartment, there may not be sufficient time to determine
the scope of the resulting harm before the summary process trial.229 In such
cases, the attorney should seek written consent from the opposing party to
litigate the lead paint claim separately.2 30 Because landlords are generally
seeking speedy and inexpensive return to possession, they may not object
to such an arrangement.
After properly raising all claims arising out of the tenancy,
attorneys should develop clear records regarding any claims thereafter
severed or dismissed by the court for reasons of convenience efficiency, or
to avoid prejudice.2 3'
Specifically, attorneys should seek an explicit
statement from the court that the claims have been dismissed without
prejudice, or that the tenant's right to raise the claims in a second action has
been reserved.2 32 Such express reservations, even if seemingly superfluous
at the time, will be extremely valuable in defending against any future
assertion of claim preclusion against the tenant.233
2. Using the Precedent to a Tenant's Advantage
Tenant attorneys responding to the threat of claim preclusion need
not be entirely on the defensive. Claim preclusion can also be used
proactively to justify treating tenant counterclaims more generously within
the summary process proceeding.234 In general, tenants will benefit from
including counterclaims within the summary process proceeding.2 35 In

229 See BALANDIS ET AL., supra note 169, at 227-28 (advising that
one wait before raising
lead paint claim to allow injury development). Other forms of personal injury attributable to
one's landlord could raise similar concerns. Id.
230 Consent from the opposing party is sufficient to defeat any future claim preclusion

defense. See supra note 184 (discussing the use of consent to avoid claim preclusion). However,
an opposing party's mere failure to object, after being notified of one's intention to bring a claim
separately, may not be sufficient. Id.
231 See supra note 222 (identifying instances of housing courts severing or dismissing
counterclaims).
232 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF JUDGMENTS § 26(l)(b) (1982) (listing express
reservation as an exception to claim preclusion).
233 Id.
234 See supra notes 90-130, 206-224 (illustrating how preclusion can justify inclusion of
counterclaims in summary process proceedings).
235 See BALANDIS ET AL., supra note 169, at 223 (explaining counterclaims are "important"
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evictions for non-payment of rent or without fault, damages awarded on
counterclaims can be used as a defense to a landlord's claim for
possession. 236 Even when such counterclaims cannot be used as defenses
against the landlord's claim for possession, they may still justify an award
of money damages against the landlord.231
Unfortunately, courts may be relatively reluctant to allow tenant
counterclaims in summary process proceedings.23 8 These courts reason that
counterclaims can always be raised in a separate action, and may distract
from what is meant to be a streamlined adjudication. 239 Tenant attorneys
should urge courts to revise this attitude in light of the recent decisions
holding that counterclaims arising out of the tenancy are compulsory in
summary process. 240 Because these counterclaims are compulsory, courts
should treat them as a natural and integral part of the underlying case.24'
Courts should freely grant motions to amend answers and should reserve
severance or dismissal of counterclaims for extreme cases of prejudice or
inconvenience.
B. Policy Arguments Against Enforcement of Claim Preclusion in
Subsequent Actions
Thus far, the discussion has focused on attorney conduct within
summary process itself. However, sensitivity to claim preclusion issues is
equally important in litigating subsequent affirmative suits brought by
tenants. Landlords in such cases may argue that the tenants' claims are
barred because they should have been raised in a prior summary process
proceeding. Assuming the court accepts the premise that summary process
proceedings can have claim preclusive effect, the tenant's attorney must be
in summary process cases).
236 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 8A para. 5 (2004) ("There shall be no recovery of
possession under this chapter if the amount found by the court to be due the landlord equals or is
less than the amount found to be due the tenant or occupant by reason of any counterclaim or
defense under this section.")
237 See Ednson Realty Trust v. Robinson, No. 88-SP-7252-C, slip op. at 2-5 (Hous. Ct. Dep't
Order Nov. 21, 1988) (holding tenant could maintain counterclaim for money damages in fault
eviction).
239 See supra notes 206-224 and accompanying text (describing housing courts' treatment of
counterclaims)
239 See supra notes 222 (identifying housing courts' reasoning for disallowing counterclaims
in summary process).
240 See supra notes 90-130 and accompanying text (discussing decisions that have applied
claim preclusion to bar tenants from bringing claim in subsequent action).
241 See PGR Mgmt. Co. v. Credle, 694 N.E.2d 1273, 1276 (Mass. 1998) ("[d]efenses and
compulsory counterclaims are part and parcel of the underlying case and are adjudicated as part
of that case").
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prepared to argue that, under the circumstances of the particular case, claim
preclusion should not apply.
Courts recognize an exception to the rule of claim preclusion for
cases in which its intended goals of judicial efficiency and fairness would
not be served.242 This exception recognizes the possibility that the policy
rationale for preclusion may not apply to all cases. More specifically,
claim preclusion is designed to alter behavior; the threat of future
preclusion incentivizes litigants to raise all their claims at the same time,
thereby increasing judicial efficiency and protecting opposing parties from
repetitious lawsuits. 243 When, for whatever reason, the threat of claim
preclusion cannot successfully alter behavior, application of the doctrine is
inappropriate.244 The circumstances of summary process proceedings
explained below provide strong grounds for concluding that the threat of
claim preclusion will not have its intended effect on future litigants.245
This result justifies treating summary process as an exception, and
declining to enforce claim preclusion against tenants.
First, the uncertainty caused by Summary Process Rule 5
concerning the preclusive effect of summary process proceedings
246
undermines the potential for court enforcement to alter behavior.
Because attorneys and their clients are relying on Rule 5 to protect them
from the effects of claim preclusion, they are generally not incentivized to
raise all their claims in summary process proceedings. A single trial
court's decision to enforce claim preclusion will not alter this attitude,
which is the result of ambiguous procedural rules and conflicting appellate
court decisions. Thus, applying claim preclusion against an individual
tenant will have a purely punitive effect, without altering future behavior.
Second, the relatively informal nature of summary process
proceedings also undermines the value of enforcement. Most tenants are

242

See Gloucester Marine Rys. Corp. v. Charles Parisi, Inc., 631 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Mass.

App. Ct. 1994) ("Since claim preclusion is grounded upon considerations of fairness and efficient
judicial administration, the doctrine is not applied rigidly where such interests would not be
served." (citation omitted)).
243 See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (describing the policy behind preclusion
doctrine).
244 See Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 813 N.E.2d 476, 489 n.19 (Mass. 2004) (stating
preclusion policies would not be furthered by precluding class members' personal injury claims);
Tinkham v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 699 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (declining to find
preclusion where claim splitting was partially attributable to adversary's "misleading procedural
sparring").
245 See infra notes 246-251 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 173-224 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainty surrounding Rule
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not represented in summary process.247 Even when a tenant is represented,
the entire trial schedule is highly expedited. Answers to summary process
complaints are due within one week 248 and discovery prior to trial is
ordinarily restricted to two weeks.2 49 Furthermore, according to at least one
observer of the Boston Housing Court summary process docket, "the
judges often fail to develop a full and fair record, assist the unrepresented
litigant on procedure and questions of law, or conduct the trial in a manner
best suited to discover the facts and do justice in the case., 250 The lack of
representation and prioritization of speed in summary process may prevent
25
tenants from successfully raising and litigating their counterclaims. '
Because it cannot remedy these structural limitations, the threat of claim
preclusion will not incentivize tenants to raise counterclaims in summary
process; it will merely punish tenants for a result they were unable to avoid.
The two arguments outlined above illustrate the ways in which
summary process proceedings do not fit comfortably into the claim
preclusion model. This is an important point to make, even if the court has
concluded that the procedural rules do not prevent it from giving summary
process proceedings preclusive effect. Claim preclusion is not a doctrine to
be applied mechanically; it is a policy tool, and therefore a tenant attorney
will do well to focus the court's attention on the fact that enforcing claim
preclusion against tenants is likely to do far more harm than good.
VI. CONCLUSION
Several important principles emerge from the preceding review of
summary process law and practice in Massachusetts. As an initial matter,
Massachusetts lacks a settled legal standard for the effect of claim
preclusion on summary process counterclaims. At least some courts have
held that claim preclusion does apply, although its precise scope continues
to develop on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, the current state of the
law has significant potential to prejudice tenants subject to eviction. Lack
of accurate information among lawyers and judges in summary process
cases has resulted in a set of common practices that are insufficiently
sensitive to the threat of claim preclusion. Courts have also proved
247 See POWELL, supra note 186, at 9.
248 MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 3.
249 MASS. UNIF. SUMM. PROCESS R. 7.
250 Russell Engler, And Justice.1fr All - Including the UnrepresentedPoor: Revisiting the
Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2061 (1999) (citation
omitted).
251 See O'Leary, supra note 136, at 74-75 (describing difficulty of litigating counterclaims in
summary process).

42

SUFFOLKJOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XV

unwilling to temper the force of claim preclusion in light of the relatively
informal nature of summary process proceedings, and the unique interests it
is designed to protect.
Tenants and their representatives are not defenseless, however,
against this troubling trend in summary process law. The first step to
adequate protection is intemalization. The working assumption should be
that all counterclaims arising out of the tenancy are subject to preclusion if
not raised in summary process. Although this assumption may lead to
some greater inconvenience within the summary process case, it is well
worth the protection it will afford the tenant in any subsequent action. The
second, and admittedly more difficult, step is to make courts aware of the
problems with transposing traditional claim preclusion principles into
summary process. The unique situation of a tenant attempting to avoid
eviction cannot be equated to the average civil litigant. Awareness of this
difference may persuade courts to exercise more leniency in applying claim
preclusion principles in this context.
Admittedly, this article has not addressed the most effective
solution to the problem of claim preclusion in summary process: legislative
reform. This omission is not meant to suggest that legislative reform is
either unwarranted or infeasible. Rather, it merely acknowledges the fact
that any legislative solution will be too late to protect the tenants who are
defending against evictions in housing court today. These tenants need
protection from the very immediate threat of forfeiting valid legal claims.
Such protection can only come from the kind of careful litigation strategies
and arguments suggested in this article. Ideally, adoption of these practices
will ensure that tenants do not become the unwitting victims of an
inconspicuously set, yet potentially fatal, procedural trap.

